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REEXAMINING THE PARITY PROMISE: MORE
CHALLENGES THAN SUCCESSES TO THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COLUMBIA BASIN
FISH AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM
By
MICHAEL

C. BLUMM*

The Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program is the centerpiece of continuing efforts to preserve and restore salmon
and steelhead runs in the Northwest. Professor Blumm examines the directives of the Northwest Power Act which authorized the program and evaluates the first three-and-ahalf years of program implementation, including amendments adopted by the Northwest Power Planning Council in
1984, 1985, and 1986. He also surveys several impending
threats to successful implementation, rangingfrom constitutional challenges to the Council, to electric power exports to
California,to widespread reluctance on the part of federal
water project operators and regulators to carry out various
program provisions. Professor Blumm concludes that these
threats, along with the Northwest Power PlanningCouncil's
reluctance to approve increased fish passage protection in
1986, indicate an uncertain future for the program and its
restoration goals.
* Professor of Law, Northwestern School of Law of Lewis and Clark College.
LL.M. 1979, J.D. 1976, George Washington University; B.A. 1972, Williams College. This is another in a series of Articles on the Columbia Basin Fish and Wild-

life Program written with the support of the Oregon State University Sea Grant
College Program, under a grant from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, United States Department of Commerce (Grant No. 81AA-D-00086).
The views expressed here are mine alone, however, not the views of NOAA or the
U.S. Government. An earlier version of this Article was presented to the Tenth
Annual Marine Recreational Fisheries Symposium held in Seattle on April 25-26,
1985 and appeared in Issue 30 of the ANADROMOUS FISH LAW MEMo (June 1985), a
publication of the Natural Resources Law Institute. Lorraine Bodi, Janis Carpenter, Dale Goble, Robert Lothrop, Frank Ostrander, Terry Thatcher, and John
Volkman made helpful comments on a draft of this Article, but they are not responsible for any errors that remain. D.H. Cole, third-year student, Northwestern
School of Law of Lewis and Clark College, supplied helpful editorial assistance,
and Steven Manas, third-year student, Northwestern School of Law of Lewis and
Clark College, provided valuable legislative research. The Article is dedicated to
Steven's memory.
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INTRODUCTION: THE COLUMBIA BASIN PROGRAM AT MIDDECADE

As Charles Wilkinson recently illustrated, the law's effect on
salmon management has been mostly pernicious, giving sanction
to jurisdictional boundaries and institutional limitations unrelated to the resource's biological needs or its migratory range.'
1. See generally Wilkinson & Conner, The Law of the Pacific Salmon Fishery: Conservation and Allocation of a Transboundary Common Property Re-
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Recently, a good deal of legal attention has been devoted to reversing this effect, as legislators, negotiators, and jurists have attempted to create comprehensive management regimes to overcome the problems inherent with fragmentation.2 Surely one of
the most notable results of this attempt at synthesis was the 1980
enactment of the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and
Conservation Act (Northwest Power Act).' And certainly among
the most vital areas in the field of Pacific Salmon Law are the
ongoing efforts to implement the product of that statute, the
Northwest Power Planning Council's Columbia Basin Fish and
4
Wildlife Program.
At mid-decade, the program, in its fourth year, had been substantively amended three times and faced numerous implementation challenges. Although these challenges seemed to tower above
the program's accomplishments, the latter nevertheless are numerous." This Article reexamines the 1980 statute and the 1982
source, 32 U. KAN. L. REv. 17 (1983).
2. See, e.g., The Salmon and Steelhead Enhancement Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 330134 (1982), analyzed in Elicker, The Salmon and Steelhead Enhancement Act:
Laudable Goals, Little Funding [1979-Present Transfer Binder], 15 ANADROMOUS
FISH L. MEMO (NAT. RESOURCES L. INST.) 1-14 (Aug. 1981); Treaty Between the
Government of the United States of America and the Government of Canada Concerning Pacific Salmon, Treaty Doc. No. 99-2 (entered into force, Mar. 18, 1985);
analyzed in Jensen, The United States/Canada Pacific Salmon Interception
Treaty: An Historicaland Legal Overview, 16 ENVTL. L. 363 (1986); Confederated
Tribes v. Baldrige, No. 80-342T (W.D. Wash. Aug. 4, 1981) (directing the states of
Oregon and Washington to negotiate a comprehensive allocation plan for the Columbia River fishery with Indian tribes with treaty fishing rights). For a cogent
plea for comprehensive conservation development planning among Northwest utilities, even in an era of power surplus, see 1 NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL,
NORTHWEST CONSERVATION AND ELECTRIC POWER PLAN 2-1 to 2-11, 9-2 to 9-3, 9-47
to 9-50 (1986).
3. 16 U.S.C. §§ 839-839h (1982); see Symposium on the Northwest Power
Act, 13 ENVTL. L. 593-1029 (1983); see also Symposium on Energy Issues in the
Pacific Northwest, 58 WASH. L. REV. 175-482 (1983).
4. NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, COLUMBIA BASIN FISH AND WILDLIFE
PROGRAM, as amended (1984) [hereinafter cited as COLUMBIA BASIN PROGRAM].
5. Among the program's most far-reaching accomplishments are those of an
institutional nature. Perhaps the most notable is the institutionalization of fish
and wildlife concern in an entity, the Northwest Power Planning Council, whose
directives power agencies and interests believe they must respect. Another institutional accomplishment is the nurturing of cooperation among the state fishery
agencies and Indian tribes (long mortal foes) in enterprises such as the Water
Budget Center (now the Fish Passage Center, see infra section VI.C). An institutional innovation not to be overlooked is the Council's public information pro-
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program,6 analyzes amendments to the program during its first
four years, and evaluates both the program's accomplishments
and the impending challenges.
When President Carter signed the Northwest Power Act into
law on December 5, 1980,7 the Pacific Northwest began what is
undoubtedly the most ambitious fishery restoration effort ever
undertaken. The statute gave new and unprecedented legal protection to the Columbia Basin's anadromous fish runs. It promised to "protect, mitigate, and enhance" fish and wildlife resources - especially anadromous fish' - adversely affected by
the development and operation of the Columbia Basin hydroelectric system, the largest integrated hydroelectric system in the
world.' To achieve this goal, Congress authorized the four Pacific
Northwest states to establish a new interstate agency, the Northwest Power Planning Council, 0 to develop a comprehensive program giving direction and scope to this restoration effort. Section
II of this Article examines the 1980 statute and the forces that led
to it.
Two years after the passage of the Act, in November 1982,
gram, which has consistently supplied high quality information to the public (and
Congress) on fishery issues and opportunities to participate in decisions involving
fishery/hydropower tradeoffs. This information and these opportunities seldom
were available in the pre-Northwest Power Act era.
6. For an earlier, more detailed analysis of the 1980 statute and the 1982 program, see Blumm, Implementing the Parity Promise: An Evaluation of the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program, 14 ENVTL. L. 277 (1984) [hereinafter
cited as ParityIII]; for a briefer account, see Blumm, Beyond Mitigation: Restoring Federally Damaged Salmon Runs Under the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program, 14 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 10,010 (1984).
7. Pub. L. 95-501, 94 Stat. 2697 (1980).
8. Anadromous (meaning ascending rivers to spawn) fish include five species
of Pacific salmon and steelhead trout (a sea-run rainbow trout), the most economically valuable anadromous species in the Pacific Northwest. Anadromous fish are
born in fresh water, migrate to the ocean for periods of two to five years (depending on the species), and return to fresh water to spawn. See generally A. NETBOY,
SALMON: THE WORLD'S MOST HARASSED FISH (1980). Other anadromous species
include lampreys, shad, smelt, and striped bass.
9. UNITED STATES COMPTROLLER GENERAL, REGION AT THE CROSSROADS --

THE

PACIFIC NORTHWEST SEARCHES FOR NEW SOURCES OF ELECTRIC ENERGY 3.1 (1978)
(Rep. No. EMD-7876). See generally Wandschneider, Managing River Systems:
Centralization Versus Decentralization,24 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1043 (1984) (case
study of Columbia River management).
10. See 16 U.S.C. § 839b(a).
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the Regional Council promulgated its Columbia Basin Fish and
Wildlife Program, 1 a systemwide program containing not only
enhancement measures and research priorities but also directives
that promised immediate changes in the operation of hydroelectric dams. Section III reviews the principal provisions of the 1982
program. Some two years later, in October 1984, the Council approved amendments to the program that sharpened its focus, establishing a five-year action plan containing detailed priorities
and time deadlines."3 The 1984 amendments are the subject of
section IV's analysis.
Although originally the next round of program amendments
was not scheduled until late 1986, the Council was forced to consider amendments to shore up deficiencies in the program in early
1985 and again in early 1986. First, in February 1985, the Council
removed the federal Bonneville Power Administration (BPA)
from a key role in the process of setting program goals."3 Second,
in February 1986, the Council rejected a proposed amendment
that would have strengthened interim survival objectives for juve-5
nile fish at mainstem dams,14 a major defect in the program.'
Section V assesses these developments.
Finally, section VI outlines a number of impending challenges to the program and its objectives. These challenges range
from constitutional attacks on the authority of the Northwest
Power Planning Council, to unanswered questions about the relationship between extraregional power sales and the program, to
the failure of federal water managers and regulators to implement
certain program provisions, to an irrational federal hydroelectric
licensing scheme that could jeopardize the program's investments.
The Article concludes that the program will need the sustained
efforts of the Council, Congress, and the public if it is to achieve
11. NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, COLUMBIA BASIN FISH AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM (1982) [hereinafter cited as 1982 COLUMBIA BASIN PROGRAM].
12. COLUMBIA BASIN PROGRAM, supra note 4.

13. See infra text accompanying notes 105-06.
14. See NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, ISSUE PAPER ON ALTERNATIVE
INTERIM FISH PASSAGE OBJECTIVES (n.d.) [hereinafter cited as FISH PASSAGE ISSUE
PAPER].

15. See Lothrop, The Failureof the Fish Passage Provisionsof the Columbia
Basin Fish and Wildlife Program and Some Suggested Remedies [1979-Present
Transfer Binder], 34 ANADROMOUS FISH L. MEMO (NAT. RESOURCES L. INST.) 1-7

(Nov. 1985).
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its restoration promise.

H.

THE

1980 NORTHWEST POWER ACT: ESTABLISHING THE
PARITY PROMISE

For a half century, the federal government constructed and
licensed numerous dams on the Columbia River and its tributaries to control floods, supply irrigation water, and generate hydroelectric power.'" By the mid-1970's, the Columbia was the most
dammed river basin in the world: twenty-eight federal projects (to
say nothing of nonfederal, utility-owned projects) produce more
than 13,000 megawatts of electricity and store more than twenty
million acre-feet of water.' 7 While these dams enabled the Northwest to electrify rural areas, cultivate the high desert, and attract
electric-intensive industries - like the aluminum industry - to
the region, they also devastated the Columbia's once-prodigious
salmon runs."8 Between the mid-1930's.and the mid-1970's, the
commercial Columbia salmon catch declined by two-thirds (from
twenty-one million pounds to six-and-a-half million pounds) and
spawning habitat diminished by more than one-half (from
163,000 to 73,000 square miles).' 9 Although the dams were not the
exclusive cause for this decline - poor logging, grazing, and farming practices, and overfishing played roles - there is little question that dams were the principal culprits.2" The situation became
so desperate in the late 1970's that the National Marine Fisheries
Service and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service began an
16. For an excellent historical overview of dam building in the Columbia Basin, see Goble, Introduction to Symposium on Legal Structures for ManagingPacific Northwest Salmon and Steelhead: The Biological and Historical Context, 22
IDAHO L. REv, no. 3 (forthcoming, 1986); see also Wilkinson & Conner, supra note
1, at 35-43 (describing the dam building era).
17. COLUMBIA BASIN PROGRAM, supra note 4, at i.
18. See Wilkinson & Conner, supra note 1, at 40-41.
19. COLUMBIA BASIN PROGRAM, supra note 4, at i; see also NORTHWEST POWER
PLANNING COUNCIL, DRAFT COMPILATION OF INFORMATION ON SALMON AND STEELHEAD LOSSES IN THE COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN 205-07 (1985) (estimating run size declines since 1850 at tenfold and loss of upriver habitat at around 50%).

20. See generally Blumm, Hydropower vs. Salmon: The Struggle of the Pacific Northwest's Anadromous Fish Resources for a Peaceful Coexistence with the
Federal Columbia Power System, 11 ENVTL. L. 211 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Hydropower vs. Salmon]; see also UNITED STATES COMPTROLLER GENERAL, IMPACTS
AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST POWER BILL 20 (1979) (Rep. No.
EMD 79-105) [hereinafter cited as 1979 GAO REPORT].
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administrative proceeding to determine whether certain upriver
salmon and steelhead runs could qualify for protection under the
Endangered Species Act.2
The Endangered Species Act proceeding and a United States
General Accounting Office study22 served to focus attention on
the problems the hydroelectric system posed for the viability of
the anadromous fish runs at a time when Congress, responding to
what was then perceived to be an imminent electric shortage, was
rewriting Northwest electric policies. As a result, what was originally a bill designed to expand the authority of the BPA, the region's federal electric power wholesaler, the Northwest Power Act
also became, under the leadership of Congressman John Dingell,2"
a law calling for fisheries restoration "to the extent affected by
the development and operation" of the Columbia Basin's hydroelectric system.2 4 The legislative history indicated that Congress
intended to make fishery protection and restoration a "coequal
partner" with electric power generation, "on a par" with other authorized project purposes.25
The statute contained a number of innovations designed to
overcome the inadequacies of previous fishery restoration attempts which were aptly characterized as "too little and too
late." 6 First, the Act broadened the focus of concern from indi21. 43 Fed. Reg. 45,628 (Oct. 3, 1978); see Bodi, Protecting Columbia River
Salmon Under the Endangered Species Act, 10 ENVTL. L. 349 (1980). Recently,
the National Marine Fisheries Service indicated it is considering listing the winter
run of chinook salmon in California's Sacramento River for "threatened species"
status under the Endangered Species Act. See 51 Fed. Reg. 5391 (Feb. 13, 1986)
(determining that a petition from the California-Nevada Chapter of the American
Fisheries Society presented substantial scientific information indicating that listing may be warranted).
22. 1979 GAO REPORT, supra note 20.
23. For remembrances of some of those involved in the development of the
legislation, including Congressman Dingell, see Northwest Power Planning Council, Nw. ENERGY NEWS, Dec.-Jan. 1986, at 4-33.
24. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(10)(A) (1982); for an overview of the fish and wildlife
provisions in the statute and their legislative history, see Blumm & Johnson,
Promising A Process For Parity: The Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning
and Conservation Act and Anadromous Fish Protection,11 ENVTL. L. 497 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Parity 1].
25. HousE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, H.R. REP. No. 976,
pt. 1, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 49, 56-57 (1980).
26. See Blumm, Fulfilling the Parity Promise: A Perspective on Scientific
Proof,Economic Cost, and Indian Treaty Rights in the Approval of the Colum-
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vidual projects to the entire Columbia Basin by mandating a systemwide remedial program.2 7 Second, the Act effectively redefined mitigation to emphasize altering project operations s (not
simply procuring replacement resources) and to include "offsite
enhancement," meaning that irretrievable losses in particular locations can be compensated by remedial efforts in other locations
in the basin.29 Third, the Act lowered the burden of proof necessary to justify remedial effort by requiring that program measures
be based only on "best available scientific knowledge,' 3 not absolute certainty, and by favoring biological outcomes over economic
outcomes (authorizing the minimum cost alternatives only where
it would achieve "the same sound biological objective").3 ' Fourth,
the Act created a number of new institutional arrangements to
formulate and implement the program: it gave the authority to
approve program measures to a nonfederal, interstate Northwest
Power Planning Council;3 2 it required the Council to act only after widespread public involvement, 3 on the basis of recommendations submitted by the region's fish and wildlife agencies, Indian
tribes, hydropower project operators and regulators and the public; 4 and it required federal water project operators and regulators (the United States Army Corps of Engineers, the BPA, the
Bureau of Reclamation, and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)) to implement the program "to the fullest extent
bia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program, 13 ENVTL. L. 103, 108-12 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as Parity II].
27. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(1)(A) ("the program, to the greatest extent possible,
shall be designed to deal with [the Columbia] river and its tributaries as a
system").
28. Id. §§ 839b(1)(A), (2)(B), (5) and (6)(E)(8).
29. Id. § 839b(8)(A) ("Enhancement measures may be used, in appropriate
circumstances, as a means of achieving offsite protection and mitigation with respect to compensation for losses arising from the development and operation of
hydroelectric facilities of the Columbia River and its tributaries as a system").
30. Id. § 839b(h)(6)(B). Under the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 16
U.S.C. §§ 661-666c (1982), water project operators and regulators effectively
placed the burden of proof on fishery interests to document losses, as well as anticipated benefits, from proposed mitigation measures. See Parity II, supra note
26, at 110-11.
31. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(6)(C).
32. Id. § 839b(a); see Hemmingway, The Northwest Power Planning Council:
Its Origins and Future Role, 13 ENVTL. L. 673 (1983).
33. Id. §§ 839b(h)(3) and (4).
34. Id. ]§ 839]b(h) (3)-(5).
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practicable." ' Finally, the Act authorized electric ratepayer (as
opposed to taxpayer) financing of the program, directing the BPA
to use its financial and legal authorities "in a manner consistent"
with the program.3"
These innovations place the Northwest Power Act in the vanguard of federal fish and wildlife law. They reflect congressional
sentiment that unprecedented, expeditious action was necessary
to restore the Columbia Basin's salmon and steelhead runs.
III.

THE

1982

COLUMBIA BASIN FISH AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM:
IMPLEMENTING THE PARITY PROMISE

The process the Council pursued in developing the program
proved to be nearly as unique as the statute which authorized it.
After receiving over 400 recommended program measures and

supporting documents totaling over 2200 pages in 1981, the Council conducted a regionwide public involvement campaign throughout 1982, including two rounds of public hearings, some 3200
pages of public testimony, and over 5000 pages of written comments from more than 600 commentators.37 After culmination of
this exceptional public participation process, the Council promulgated the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program on November 15, 1982.
The most significant element of the program was the Water
35. Id. § 839(h)(11)(A)(ii).
36. Id. § 839b(h)(10)(A). On the advantages of ratepayer funding of the program, see Parity III, supra note 6, at 348-50. In addition, the Act required federal
water project operators and regulators to give "equitable treatment" to Columbia
Basin fish and wildlife, but this directive exists independently of the program. It
is, however, a directive that is judicially enforceable. See Yakima Indian Nation v.
Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n., 746 F.2d 466, 473 (9th Cir. 1984) (fish protection and power generation stand "on an equal footing"), discussed in Supreme
Court, Ninth Circuit Decisions Curb FERC Hydroelectric Authority: Good News
for Fish and Wildlife [1979-Present Transfer Binder] 26 ANADROMOUS FISH L.
MEMO (NAT. RESOURCES L. INST.) 5-7 (July 1984). Precisely what constitutes "equitable treatment" has never been defined, but as a utility representative recently
concluded, "On the subject of equity, I have always felt that one of the clearest
hallmarks of equity is equality." Letter of Merril S. Shultz, Intercompany Pool, to
Dulcey Mahar, Northwest Power Planning Council Director of Public Involvement
(May 15, 1985) (commenting on the Council Staff Issue Paper entitled "The Role
of Power Institutions in the 1985 Power Plan"); cf. infra note 236 (a FERC administrative law judge's interpretation of "equitable treatment").
37. See COLUMBIA BASIN PROGRAM, supra note 4, § 100.
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Budget, a block of about four-and-a-half million acre-feet of
water, designed to facilitate downstream anadromous fish migration in the spring.38 Essentially, the Water Budget is designed to
augment flows to simulate the lost spring freshet, now largely
stored behind the Basin's dams for hydroelectric and other purposes. Water Budget flows come from water that would otherwise
be saved to generate electricity later in the year. The program
gave control over the use of this water to representatives of the
region's fish and wildlife agencies and Indian tribes. 39 Although
there remain important, unresolved issues concerning how to implement the concept,40 there is little question that the Water
Budget represents the most prominent remedial measure in the
program and the most significant change in Columbia Basin dam
operations in a generation."' There is virtually no precedent for
giving fish and wildlife representatives significant management
control over such a large block of water.
Increasing spring flows, however, does not necessarily ensure
successful downstream passage around particular dams. Many
Columbia Basin dams have ladders to enable adults to migrate
upstream, but no protective facilities (like screens and mechanical
bypass facilities) to keep downstream migrating juvenile fish out
of the power turbines. Thus, the program directed three mid-Columbia public utility districts to spill at least twenty percent of
the flow during thirty days of the sixty-day downstream migrant
season to help improve juvenile bypass until they install sufficient
structural facilities.42 The program also established a five-year
43
schedule for facility installation at these mid-Columbia dams.

Unfortunately, implementation of these measures requires
approval by FERC, an agency which has proved to be a less than
38. Id. § 304; see J. LAWRENCE, K. LEE & R. PALMER, THE WATER BUDGET: A
STEP TOWARDS BALANCING FISH AND POWER IN THE COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN (1983)

(U. of Wash. Water Resources Tech. Rep. No. 81).
39. COLUMBIA BASIN PROGRAM, supra note 4, §§ 304(b)-(c). In practice, how-

ever, this promised "control" has proved to be largely illusory. See infra section

VI.C.
40. See infra section VI.C.
41. That is, since the signing of the Pacific Northwest Coordination Agreement, as a result of the ratification of the Columbia River Treaty in 1964, see
Hydropower vs. Salmon, supra note 20, at 243-47.
42. COLUMBIA BASIN PROGRAM, supra note 4, § 404(a)(10).

43. Id. § 404(a)(1)-(3).
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enthusiastic program implementor." The program also sanctioned a controversial "short haul" transportation study promoted by one of the public utility districts, which might eventually serve as a substitute for structural bypass installation.
However, perhaps the biggest weakness in the 1982 program was
its vague directives to the Corps of Engineers concerning necessary spills and structural installation at eight Corps dams on the
lower Columbia and Snake Rivers.4 ' The lack of specificity in
these provisions hampered the program from 1983-1985 and
caused the Council to amend the program in early 1986 to avoid a
fourth consecutive year of poor fish passage performance at these
47
dams.
Recognizing that fish flows and bypass measures, even if successfully implemented, cannot redress by themselves past damage
to the fish runs, the Council included numerous habitat rehabilitation and passage restoration measures in the program.4 8 Unlike
past mitigation efforts, which concentrated almost exclusively on
hatchery construction, the program expressed a clear preference
for restoring naturally spawning fish runs which, because they are
subject to constant natural selection pressures, will preserve the
genetic integrity and diversity of the species.4' To carry out this
preference, the program included a measure calling for an evaluation of the suitability of flows for selected natural spawning
grounds throughout the basin.50 The program also specified a list
44. See, e.g., infra sections VI.E.-H.
45. See COLUMBIA BASIN PROGRAM, supra note 4, § 404(a)(4)-(8). While proceeding with this "short haul" study, Grant County Public Utility District is also
conducting prototype tests of a collection and bypass system at Priest Rapids

Dam. Id.
46. Id. § 404(b).
47. See infra text accompanying notes 110-32.
48. See COLUMBIA BASIN PROGRAM, supra note 4, §§ 704(b) and (d).
49. See id. § 701; see also Oregon Trout's Scientific Advisory Committee, The
Value of Wild Fish [1979-Present Transfer Binder] 30 ANADROMOUS FISH L.
MEMO (NAT. R.souRcEs L. INST.) 14 (June 1985); Workshop on the Late, Great
Columbia River Fishery (Part 1) [1979-Present Transfer Binder] 32 ANADROMOUS
FISH L. MEMO (NAT. RESOURczs L. INST.) 6-7 (Aug. 1985) (statement of Bill
Bakke); Klarquist, Oregon's Wild Fish Management Policy: Large Promises, Few
Deliveries [1979-Present Transfer Binder], 25 ANADROMOUS FISH L. MEMO (NAT.
REsouRcEs L. INST.) 1-9 (May 1984); Wilkinson & Conner, supra note 1, at 85-92.
See generally B.
SALMON

50.

BROWN,

MOUNTAIN IN THE CLOUDS: A SEARCH FOR THE WILD

(1982).
COLUMBIA BASIN PROGRAM,

supra note 4, § 704(b). The program gave par-
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of general protective conditions which any new hydroelectric facilities must meet.51 In addition, the Council promised to (1)
study the cumulative impacts of existing and future hydroelectric
developments on the fish runs, 52 (2) identify critical stream
reaches where there should be no further hydroelectric development,5 3 and (3) conduct a "site ranking" study that will identify
sites that are both acceptable and unacceptable for future hydro5 4
electric development.
Artificial propagation was not ignored, however. The program
authorized a study of the effectiveness of existing hatcheries, a
survey of potential hatchery sites, and a plan for "reprogramming" of lower river hatchery fish upriver." In addition, three
major hatchery facilities were authorized: juvenile release and
adult collection and holding facilities on the Umatilla Indian Reservation, an acclimation pond above the John Day Dam, and a
hatchery to be constructed in the Yakima Basin. 6 However, the
program conditioned the John Day and Yakima facilities upon
the Council's finding that harvest management controls, both
ocean and in-river, were "adequate. '57 It also established a plan
ticular emphasis to improving spawning flows on the Hanford Reach of the midColumbia and on the Snake River below Hells Canyon Dam. Id. §§ 704(b)(1)-(5).

51. Id. § 1204(a).
52. Id. § 1204(b).
53. Id. § 1204(c).
54. Actually, this "site ranking" study is part of the Council's NORTHWEST
CONSERVATION AND

ELECTRIC POWER PLAN (at 10-19 to 10-20) (approved in Apr.

1983). It therefore has a broader geographic reach than measures contained in the
Columbia Basin Program, since it includes the entire Pacific Northwest, not just
the Columbia Basin. For an examination of fish and wildlife protection under the
Northwest Power Act outside the Columbia Basin, see Thatcher, The Pacific
Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act: Fish and Wildlife
Protection Outside the Columbia River Basin, 13 ENVTL. L. 517 (1983). For an
overview of the Council's power plan by two of its drafters, see Evans & Hemmingway, Northwest Power Planning: Origins and Strategies, 1 Nw. ENVTL. J. no.
1 at 1 (1984); see also Cavanaugh, Electrical Energy Futures, 14 ENVTL. L. 133
(1983).
55. COLUMBIA BASIN PROGRAM, supra note 4, §§ 704(f)-(h). "Reprogramming"
hatchery fish upriver is necessary to rebuild upriver stocks, because most of the
hatcheries constructed as mitigation for federal hydroelectric development under
the Mitchell Act of 1938, 16 U.S.C. §§ 755-75 as amended in 1946, were situated in
the lower basin. See COLUMBIA RIVER INTER-TRIBAL FISH COMM'N., THE MITCHELL
ACT: AN ANALYSIS (1981).
56. COLUMBIA BASIN PROGRAM, supra note 4, § 704(i).
57. This condition, originally § 504(b)(2) of the 1982 program, supra note 11,
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for "low capital" propagation facilities on the Nez Perce Indian
Reservation."
Singled out for special attention was the Yakima Basin,
partly because of a shortage of water to satisfy both fishery and
irrigation demands, but also for its considerable habitat restoration potential."9 Here, the program specified a number of remedial measures (especially fish passage facilities at nonpower dams
and irrigation diversions) as "offsite enhancement:" 60 that is, mitigation measures to compensate for hydropower-related losses
elsewhere in the Columbia Basin. 1 Unfortunately, the Bureau of
Reclamation and the BPA raised a number of questions about the
Bureau's authority to accept funds to restore adult and juvenile
passage at its projects, and these questions served to delay implementation of many measures.6 2 However, in 1984 Congress passed
emergency legislation specifically authorizing the Bureau to accept the funds. 3 Whether it will prove necessary for Congress to
enact similar legislation to implement similar program measures
outside the Yakima Basin remains uncertain.
The program also included wildlife and resident fish measures that are beyond the scope of this article.14 Not included in
the program - but promised after the completion of studies on
anadromous fish losses due to hydroelectric development and current and potential carrying capacity - were area-by-area and
stock-by-stock goals.6 5 Goals are a critical element of the program, since they will serve to define the extent of ratepayer liability, as well as provide the principal litmus to judge the efficacy of
the program.6 6 However, although the Council originally anticipated promulgating program goals in 1984," the goal setting prowas deleted in the 1984 amendments; see infra note 91 and accompanying text.
58. COLUMBIA BASIN PROGRAM, supra note 4, § 7040).
59. See id. § 901.
60. See id. §§ 904(b)-(d) (improvements at Prosser, Roza, and Wapato
Dams), id. Table 3 (other Yakima Basin passage improvement projects).
61. Offsite enhancement is authorized by § 4(h)(8)(A) of the Northwest
Power Act. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
62. See Parity III, supra note 6, at 323-27, 346-47.
63. See infra section VI.D.
64. See COLUMBIA BASIN PROGRAM, supra note 4, §§ 804, 1004; Parity IlI,
supra note 6, at 331-34.
65. COLUMBIA BASIN PROGRAM, supra note 4, § 201.
66. See Parity III, supra note 6, at 289-93.
67. 1982 COLUMBIA BASIN PROGRAM, supra note 11, §§ 201(5)-(7).
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cess was delayed, partially because the Council originally gave too
much discretion to BPA to oversee the process.6 8 By mid-1986 the
program's goals remained undefined. 9
Finally, the program attempted to speed implementation by
defining the statutory directive requiring federal water project
operators and regulators to take the program "into account to the
fullest extent practicable. 1 70 To the Council, this meant that Congress intended federal agencies to implement program measures
or supply written explanations why implementation would be
physically, legally, or otherwise impractical, including all possible
allowances to permit implementation." Further, the program included important measures aimed specifically at the BPA and
FERC, two recalcitrant federal agencies. First, it directed FERC
to consolidate review of all proposals for hydroelectric development in single river basins and assess their cumulative impacts. 2
Second, it directed the BPA to ensure that all power sale, power
scheduling, and intertie arrangements are consistent with the program." Both of these directives generated controversy/4

IV.

THE

1984

PROGRAM AMENDMENTS: CRYSTALLIZING PARITY IN
A FIVE-YEAR ACTION PLAN

Only a year after approving the program, the Council initiated its first amendment process," again publicly soliciting rec68. See infra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
69. However, in September 1985, the Council did take the first step toward
setting program goals, releasing a draft study on salmon and steelhead losses. See
supra note 19; see also infra notes 108-109 and accompanying text (describing
subsequent developments).
70. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(11)(A)(ii) (1982).
71. COLUMBIA BASIN PROGRAM, supra note 4, § 1304(a)(4).
72. Id. § 1204(b)(1).
73. Id. §§ 1304(a)(1)-(3).
74. See infra sections VI.B and E.

75. The Council may amend the program on its own motion any time, after
providing for public comment and consultation with interested parties. COLUMBIA
BASIN PROGRAM, supra note 4, § 1404(a)(1). Recommendations for amendments
from the public are solicited every two years under the schedule established by
the Council's NORTHWEST CONSERVATION AND ELECTRIC POWER PLAN 11-2 (1983).
The next round of scheduled amendments will be adopted in early 1987 (recommendations originally were due in December 1985; The deadline was subsequently

extended to February 1986, see infra note 132). There is some sentiment among
the Council's staff that amending the program every two years devotes too much
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ommendations. By November 1983, the Council had received 140
recommended amendments, which became the subject of fourteen
issue papers and a draft amendment document, released for public review in June 1984.76 Four months later, in October 1984, the
Council adopted amendments that set interim goals for the program, strengthened mainstem fish passage measures, and added
numerous measures designed to enhance both natural and hatchery production capability. In addition, to increase the focus on
implementation, the Council added a Five-Year Action Plan that
specified numerous time deadlines for action by federal hydropower project operators and regulators.7
Delays in pertinent studies funded by BPA made it impossible for the Council to set anadromous fish goals in the 1984
amendments and ultimately led to a 1985 program amendment. 8
However, the 1984 amendments did establish three interim goals:
(1) to increase the quality and quantity of salmon and steelhead
produced in the Columbia Basin (by improving mainstem passage, by providing Water Budget flows, by protecting against adverse effects of new hydroelectric development, and by increasing
systemwide productive capability); (2) to protect ratepayer investment in the program (by improving harvest controls and
monitoring the effectiveness of program measures); and (3) to
proceed with wildlife and resident fish measures only where they
79
do not conflict with anadromous fish measures.
The most significant of the amendments concerned mainstem
passage measures at Corps of Engineers projects, where the Council was more specific than it had been two years earlier as to what
it expected of the Corps,80 although not specific enough to avoid
having to amend these provisions again in early 1986.81 The best
time to the amendment process and deflects attention from oversight of implementation efforts.
76. COLUMBIA BASIN PROGRAM, supra note 4, § 102.
77. The Five Year Action Plan effectively reorganizes the program into eleven
"Action Items," see id. § 1504. According to the Council, the Action Plan was
necessitated by policy disputes between fish and wildlife agencies and federal
water project operators and managers over the pace of funding, the scientific basis
for action, and the anticipated biological consequences. Id. § 1501.
78. See infra text accompanying notes 105-09.
79. COLUMBIA BASIN PROGRAM, supra note 4, § 1503.
80. Id. § 1504, "Action Items" Nos. 32.2-.10.
81. See infra text accompanying notes 110-124.
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publicized of the 1984 amendments called on the Corps to improve significantly bypass efficiencies at the Bonneville Dam second powerhouse, or (subject to certain exceptions) shut the powerhouse down during the downstream migrant season.8 2 Although
designed as a state-of-the-art bypass, the second powerhouse has
achieved only fourteen to thirty-five percent fish passage efficiency (fourteen to thirty-five percent of the juveniles avoid the
power turbines), instead of the eighty-five percent the Council
considered to be state-of-the-art.85 For new bypass facilities, the
Council set a design criterion of ninety percent bypass efficiency.
However, its interim goal over the next five years is to achieve a
ninety percent survival rate at each mainstem dam,"' a less stringent standard than one based on bypass efficiency (since not all
juveniles passing through power turbines perish), one much more
difficult to monitor and control, and one which the fishery agencies and tribes maintain provides inadequate fishery protection. 8
To achieve ninety percent survival at all projects, the 1984
amendments ordered the Corps to (1) prepare annual coordinated
systemwide juvenile passage plans; (2) prepare a comprehensive
report on barge and truck transportation; and (3) install new bypass systems over the next five years at The Dalles, Ice Harbor,
and Lower Monumental Dams.86
Most of the 1984 amendments concerned new or amended
propagation measures. Continuing its emphasis on natural propagation, the Council added twenty-seven new habitat improvement
and passage restoration projects as "offsite enhancement" mea82.

COLUMBIA BASIN PROGRAM,

supra note 4, § 404(b)(5).

83. Id.
84. Id. § 403 (design criterion); § 1504, "Action Item" No. 32.2 (interim goal).
In August 1985, the fish and wildlife agencies and tribes requested that the Council change the interim smolt survival standard prior to the 1986 juvenile migration

season. See Memorandum from Janis Chrisman, Fish and Wildlife Division Director, Northwest Power Planning Council on Quarterly Report, Five-Year Action
Plan (Aug. 5, 1985) [hereinafter cited as Chrisman Memorandum]; FISH PASSAGE
ISSUE PAPER, supra note 14, at 10.
85. On the fishery agency and tribal opposition to the 90% survival standard,
see infra note 114 and accompanying text; see also Northwest Conservation Act
Coalition, Nw. CONSERVATION AcT REP., June 10, 1985, at 6 (Rob Lothrop of the
Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission reporting that the Corps of Engineers and the fishery agencies and tribes could not agree on project operations
necessary to produce a 90% survival rate).
86. COLUMBIA BASIN PROGRAM, supra note 4, § 1504, "Action Items" Nos.
32.2, 32.4, 32.7, 32.8.
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sures.87 Implementation of these measures, as well as previously
adopted propagation measures, is now coordinated through an annual BPA work plan (approved by the Council), focusing on a
"limited number of tributary basins" and emphasizing restoration
of "upriver stocks."88 Whether BPA possesses the technical expertise and political accountability to develop an effective sequencing of these projects under such vague Council directives remains an open question. However, the annual work plan is to be
developed in consultation with the region's fish and wildlife agencies, Indian tribes, and federal land management agencies.8,
The 1984 amendments also clarified the Council's propagation priorities: to integrate natural and hatchery propagation
while maintaining genetic diversity, and to emphasize improved
operation of existing hatchery facilities and "low capital" propagation over construction of new hatcheries.90 Nevertheless, the
Council did set time deadlines for a number of major capital
projects, including the Yakima Basin hatchery (now denominated
as a "model" hatchery), and removed the "adequate" harvest control condition preventing funding of juvenile release and adult
collection facilities and steelhead hatchery expansion on the
Umatilla Indian Reservation and temporary acclimation ponds at
John Day Dam.' A low capital propagation program on the Nez
Perce Indian Reservation was also approved.92
Perhaps the most notable change worked by the 1984 amendments was the adoption of the Five-Year "Action Plan," which
sets priorities for program measures and time deadlines for their
implementation. As originally approved, the program contained
over 220 action items for implementation by federal water managers, fish and wildlife agencies, and Indian tribes, but provided lit87. Id. §§ 703 (at 47); 704(d), table 2.
88. Id. §§ 704(d), 1504, "Action Item" No. 34.5.
89. Id. § 704(d)(1). Public review is limited to public comment prior to Councildecision on the annual plan.
90. Id. §§ 704(g), (h), and (6).
91. Id. §9 703 (at 47), 704(i). Design studies for the Yakima hatchery are set
for fiscal year 1986, id. § 1504 "Action Item" No. 34.14. Studies on the siting,
feasibility, and design of the Umatilla steelhead hatchery were due by June 1986,
id. "Action Item" No. 34.12. The John Day temporary facilities were to be completed by Spring 1986. Id. "Action Item" No. 34.13.
92. Id. § 704U)(2). Construction was to begin in May 1985. Id. § 1504, "Action
Item" No. 34.17.
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tie guidance on scheduling from the Council. Not surprisingly,
this lack of detail led to implementation delays while these entities debated priorities.0 8 The Action Plan was designed to give
more direction to the implementing entities, enabling them to
better plan and budget for timely implementation. The Five-Year
Plan provides a means for the Council, Congress, and the public
to measure the success of the program.94 Program measures not
included in the Five-Year Plan will be implemented "as soon as
possible after measures in the Action Plan are completed, or as
soon as the implementing agency can, after giving first priority to
action plan items."' 5 The Action Plan directs all implementing
agencies to submit work plans and budget evaluations concerning
program measures for which they are responsible and establishes
an annual reporting schedule to evaluate the progress of various
program measures. These reports are available to the public. 6
Finally, the Council suggested that, in overseeing program
implementation, it will employ a policy of "adaptive management" as a way to help ensure that the program meets the statutory directive of being based on "best available scientific knowledge. ' 97 Given the Northwest Power Act's mandate to
expeditiously restore Columbia Basin fish and wildlife populations, and given the pervasive scientific uncertainties that confront such a task, the program could easily delay effective remedial action while undertaking a series of research projects
designed to "prove" the effectiveness of various alternatives."
"Adaptive management" supplies a means to avoid such delays
by propounding a theory of "learning by doing:" producing
knowledge by taking action, then carefully monitoring the results
and making appropriate mid-course adjustments. Although the
Council euphemistically referred to the concept as a "scientific
93. Id. § 1501; see supra note 77.
94. The Fish and Wildlife Division staff of the Northwest Power Planning
Council now issues "quarterly reports" on all Action Items contained in the FiveYear Action Plan. Quarterly reports were issued on May 2, August 5, and November 26, 1985, and February 10, and April 1, 1986. See, e.g., supra note 84.
95. COLUMBIA BASIN PROGRAM, supra note 4, § 1503 (at 105-06).
96. Id. (at 106-07).
97. Id. (at 108) (implementing 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(6)(B) (1982); see Lee &
Lawrence, Adaptive Management: Learning from the Columbia River Basin Fish
and Wildlife Program, 16 ENVTL. L. 431 (1986).
98. For a definition of "best available scientific knowledge" that emphasizes
taking expeditious action, see Parity II, supra note 26, at 124-31.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2972390

19861

REEXAMINING THE PARITY PROMISE

policy," 9 adaptive management ought to be seen as a biological
form of policy analysis that effectively lowers the burden of proof
for taking action while increasing emphasis on monitoring and
oversight. While the details of the Council's adaptive management strategy are yet to be worked out, the heavy emphasis in the
1984 amendments on systematic reporting of program implementation provides a means to begin to employ the concept. 100
V.

THE

1985

AND

1986

AMENDMENTS: REVISING THE

GOALS PRO-

CESS AND DEFERRING INCREASED FISH PASSAGE PROTECTION

The Northwest Power Act directed the.Council to develop a
program to protect and restore Columbia Basin fish and wildlife
"to the extent affected by the development and operation of any
hydroelectric project on the Columbia River and its tributaries." 1 Consequently, the extent of the Council's remedial obligation depends on a determination of fish and wildlife losses attributable to the hydroelectric system.'"3
Because this
determination depends in turn on estimates of historic run sizes
and the relative contribution of hydroelectric dams to run size
declines, it requires a good deal of historical, anthropological, and
biological research and no small amount of guesswork. In its 1982
program, the Council assigned to BPA the obligation of funding a
study necessary to initiate the process of setting program goals
for anadromous fish. 0 3 BPA's inability or unwillingness to fund
99. COLUMBIA BASIN PROGRAM, supra note 4, § 1500 (at 108).
100. E.g., the "quarterly reports" mentioned supra note 94.
101. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(10)(A) (1982).
102. Losses are to be distinguished from program goals. Losses attributable to
the development and operation of the hydroelectric system ought to depend only
on historical and biological estimates. Goals, the means to repay the losses, may
be influenced by nature of economic and technical feasibility so that, for example,
the Council may concentrate remedial efforts in areas likely to produce the most
fish per dollar expended. Thus, offsite enhancement, supra note 29, should be
seen as a means to achieve sound biological objectives at minimum economic
costs. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(6)(C). The statute is silent as to how the remedial effort
is to be allocated, except that it could not disproportionately favor the non-Indian
fishery without violating the Act's express preservation of treaty fishing rights. 16
U.S.C. §§ 839b(h)(6)(D),10(e). Presumably, allocation of the remedial effort
among the states is a matter left to the discretion of the Council, subject of course
to the political checks and balances inherent in an interstate entity whose members are political appointees.
103. 1982 COLUMBIA BASIN PROGRAM, supra note 11, § 201(1) (losses and goals
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these studies in a timely fashion prevented the Council from
resolving the goals issue in the 1984 amendments.' 0'
Dissatisfied with the snail's pace of the goals process and
frustrated by the frequent conflicts BPA's administration of the
process engendered,105 the Council approved an unscheduled
amendment to the program in February 1985 that eliminated
BPA as the funding source for the goals studies. 06 As a result, the
Council developed its own work plan to assess fish losses and existing and potential salmon and steelhead habitat." 7 In March
1986, the Council staff released a study estimating total salmon

on a stock-by-stock, river-by.river basis).
104. The Council deleted the April 1984 date for completion of the fishery
agency and tribal goals study. Compare 1982 COLUMBIA BASIN PROGRAM, supra
note 11, § 201(5) with COLUMBIA BASIN PROGRAM, supra note 4, § 201(5).
105. See Parity III, supra note 6, at 291-92 n.58 (BPA's allegation that funding the goals study proposed by the fishery agencies and tribes was "unacceptable
to BPA management" and "not consistent with ratepayer interests" because it
would amount to "funding advocacy" and be inconsistent with "sound business
principles").
106. 50 Fed. Reg. 11,032 (1985). Amended § 201 of the Columbia Basin Program now reads:
The Council will assess salmon and steelhead losses attributable to hydropower development and operations, state goals, adopt objectives, develop methods for measuring progress toward goals and objectives, and otherwise provide a systemwide framework for program measures and action
items, following the guidelines listed in Action Item 36 [also amended in
February, 1985].
107. See NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, WORK PLAN FOR DEVELOPPRODUCTION OBJECTIVES, AND

MENT OF A PROGRAM FRAMEWORK (LOSSES, GOALS,

MEASURING TECHNIQUES), COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN FISH AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM

SECTION 201 AND ACTION ITEM 36, at 1-2 (Apr. 1985) [hereinafter cited as SECTION
201 WORK PLAN]. The "systemwide framework" promised by § 201, supra note
106, will consist of four principal elements: (1) a statement of salmon and steelhead losses attributable to Columbia Basin hydroelectric development and operations; (2) a statement of systemwide goals and objectives; (3) short-term, geographically-specific, biologically feasible production objectives; and (4) methods
for measuring and accounting for progress towards goals and objectives. Id. at 2.
As part of its § 201 "Goals Study," the Council compiled a draft list of salmon and
steelhead production areas and a draft list of blocked areas, id. at 20-22, and

promised Issue Papers on the eleven major policy issues, id. at 4-8. See also Collette, Restoring the Resource: Assessing Fish Losses - Setting Goals, Nw. ENERGY NEWS, May-June 1985, at 28-30. On July 31, 1985, three Issue Papers were
released for public comment. See NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, ISSUE
PAPERS ON PRODUCTION INVESTMENT POLICIES, PRODUCTIVITY ANALYSIS, AND RESIDENT FISH SUBSTITUTIONS (July 31, 1985).
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and steelhead run size losses of about ten-fold since the 1850's.8
Thus, the process of establishing program goals seems to be finally underway; the Council anticipates promulgating goals by
the end of 1986, some two years later than its initial estimate. 0 9
If the Council overestimated BPA's ability to manage the
goals studies,"0 it also misjudged the effect of its 1984 amendment requiring achievement of ninety percent juvenile fish survival at Corps of Engineers dams."' As the Council later realized,
the new survival standard supplied virtually no fishery protection
during average or better water years over normal dam operations." 2' Moreover, this ninety percent per project rate translated
108.

NORTHWEST

POWER

PLANNING COUNCIL, STAFF COMPILATION OF INFORMA-

17 (1986)
(estimating annual salmon and steelhead run size losses from the pre-1850, predevelopment era to the present due to all causes - not simply hydropower development and operations - at between seven and 14 million fish); see also id. at 8889 (estimating habitat losses of 31% from the pre-development era). A draft of
TION ON SALMON AND STEELHEAD LOSSES IN THE COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN 4,

this study is discussed in Cole, Regional Council Issues Draft Compilation of Columbia River Basin Fish Losses [1979-Present Transfer Binder], 34
FISH L. MEMO (NAT. RESOURCES L. INST.) 10-11 (Nov. 1985).

109. See

SECTION

201,

WORK PLAN,

ANADROMOUS

supra note 107, at 26-30 (attachment F).

A major step in the goals process occurred in April 1986, when the Council released a draft "Contributions" Issue Paper, which estimated losses attributable to
hydroelectric system development and operations of five to 11 million salmon and
steelhead, or 36-78% of the seven to 14 million in total losses (supra note 108).
NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, STAFF ISSUE PAPER ON HYDROPOWER RESPONSIBILITY FOR SALMON AND STEELHEAD LOSSES IN THE COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN 1-2
(Apr. 1986). This Issue Paper treats hydropower responsibility "as if it were a oneyear, one-time only loss," id. at 14, thus underestimating losses due to Grand Coulee Dam, for example, by a factor of 45. Nevertheless, as the staff study notes,
"[the] total hydropower responsibility range estimate of about five to eleven million salmon and steelhead is large in comparison to the present runs of about 2.5
million fish. Present runs would have to be increased by a factor of about three-tofive to meet this responsibility." Id.
110. The Council might be criticized for its naive belief that BPA could manage this sensitive issue, given a long record of opposing or hampering meaningful
fishery restoration efforts. See, e.g., Parity III, supra note 6, at 323-27, 352 n.312.
111. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text. The Council specified an
exception to the 90% survival rate by requiring an 85% passage efficiency rate at
Bonneville Dam, which is (assuming turbine mortalities at 15%) the equivalent of
a 96% survival rate. The Council decided on a higher standard for Bonneville
Dam because its lower river location means all upriver fish must pass it and because of the recent completion of its second powerhouse. See FISH PASSAGE ISSUE
PAPER, supra note 14, at 4 and nn.1 & 3.
112. Id. at 1; see also Lothrop, supra note 15, at 4.
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into a cumulative survival rate of only forty-three percent, when
all eight Corps dams were taken into account. 113
The fishery agencies and tribes never felt the 1984 amendment was adequate to improve fish passage at Corps dams, alleging that the ninety percent survival standard supplied no protection over pre-Northwest Power Act operations. 1 4 Nevertheless,
during 1985 the standard enabled the Corps to reject numerous
requests to spill water to facilitate fish passage at particular
projects."" In fact, the Corps implemented a passage plan over
the objections of the fishery agencies and tribes, which unsuccessfully sought to have the Corps adopt a plan similar to that being
implemented by the mid-Columbia public utility district
projects."' Part of the problem stems from the fact that the
Council has never required a fish passage plan to be agreed to by
the Corps and the fishery agencies and tribes. 1 7 Consequently,
the fishery agencies concluded, "in our view, the process and
' 8
product of the 1985 juvenile passage plan was unsatisfactory,""
113. Lothrop, supra note 15, at 4.
114. See WATER BUDGET CENTER, WATER BUDGET MANAGERS SUMMARY REPORT OF JUVENILE MITIGATION OPERATIONS APRIL-JUNE, 1985, at 6 (Aug. 2, 1985)

[hereinafter cited as 1985 WATER BUDGET CENTER REPORT] (alleging that the 90%
survival standard does "not provide protection above a no spill, no bypass
alternative").
115. See, e.g., WATER BUDGET CENTER WEEKLY REPORTS Nos. 85-2 (Bonneville); 85-5 (Little Goose, Lower Monumental, Ice Harbor, Bonneville); 85-7 (Little
Goose, Lower Granite). See also 1985 WATER BUDGET CENTER REPORT, supra note
114, at 6: ("Throughout 1985, all spill requests made by the [Water Budget
Center] were denied or modified on the basis that they were not in with the Corps
plan, which the Corps maintains was approved by the [Northwest Power Planning
Council]").

116. See 1985

WATER BUDGET CENTER REPORT,

supra note 114, at 6.

117. The program requires the Corps to develop juvenile fish passage plans at
various Corps dams "in consultation with" the fishery agencies and tribes, but
does not expressly require these plans to be agreed to by the fishery agencies and
tribes. See COLUMBIA BASIN PROGRAM, supra note 4, §§ 404(b)(4)(A) and (C),
404(b)(5)(B), 404(b)(8)(A) and (B), 404(b)(9)(A) and (D).
A similar problem exists with respect to conflicts between research projects
authorized by the Columbia Basin Program and fish passage operations. BPA and
the Corps interpret the program to give them the authority to resolve such conflicts, subject only to consulting with and informing the fishery agencies and
tribes. The Water Budget Managers suggest amending § 404(b) of the program to
require agreement with the fishery agencies and tribes regarding research activi-

ties. 1985

WATER BUDGET CENTER REPORT,

supra note 114, at 7-8.

118. See Letter from Dr. John Donaldson, Chairman of the Columbia Basin
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and the Water Budget Managers recommended that the program
be amended to require approval of all parties on future juvenile
passage plans. 1 9
Believing the 1984 amendments to be ineffective, in early
1985, the fishery agencies and tribes asked the Council to reconsider. The Council agreed and requested the fishery agencies and
tribes to submit a proposed program amendment to cover the
1986 and 1987 downstream migrant seasons.1 2 0 The agencies and
tribes responded with a plan they felt would improve survival by
more than twenty percent over that achieved in 1985 (and about
fifty percent more effective than the Council's survival standard).'2 Although the Council considered the agency and tribal
plan too expensive and complicated to implement, on December
12, 1985, the Council proposed to amend its survival standard to
increase it to ninety-four percent in average or high water years
and to ninety-two percent in below average water years. 122 However, on February 13, 1986, the Council backed off from its proposed standard, and (rejecting its own staff's recommendations)
adopted amendments that continued the ninety percent survival
standard during the 1986 season but extended the spill season to
include summer as well as spring migrants.'
On the basis of
Fish and Wildlife Council, to Charles Collins, Chairman of the Northwest Power
Planning Council 2 (May 31, 1985).

119. 1985

WATER BUDGET CENTER REPORT,

supra note 114, at 8 (recom-

mending an amendment to § 1504, "Action Item" No. 32.2).
120. See Lothrop, supra note 15, at 5.
121. Id. (citing Letter of John R. Donaldson, Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Council, and S. Timothy Wapato, Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Comm'n,
to Gerald Mueller, Northwest Power Planning Council (Aug. 15, 1985)).
122. See 50 Fed. Reg. 52,575 (1985); FISH PASSAGE ISSUE PAPER, supra note
14, at 2. The Council felt the fishery agency and tribal plan's reliance on in-season
monitoring data was impracticable to implement during the 1986 season because
of the Corps of Engineers' manpower, funding, and equipment shortages. Id. at 11.
123. NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, NOTICE OF FINAL AMENDMENTS
(Feb. 13, 1986) (hereinafter cited as 1986 AMENDMENTS] (amending §§ 304, 404,
and 1504 of the program). The 1986 amendments extend the spill season to cover
all but the first and last ten percent of juvenile migrants during the spring and
summer migrations, but no fish spills will be provided after August 15. See id. at
4-8. The reason for extending the spill season, according to the Council, was "that
upriver runs, particularly wild and natural runs and those originally in the Snake
River system, merit additional protection." Id. at 25. The Council also noted that
wild and natural runs "have a special status" in the Columbia Basin Program. Id.
at 27 (citing § 700 of the program). The amendments affect operations at four
Corps of Engineers' projects: Lower Monumental, Ice Harbor, The Dalles, and
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Corps of Engineers computer models, the Council concluded that
increasing the smolt survival standard above ninety percent
would not produce "significant biological benefits." ' ' The basis
for this conclusion was a high reservoir mortality rate that, if accurate, dampens benefits gained by increasing smolt survival at
dams. 12 The Council also rejected a fishery agency and tribal
proposal that they, not the Corps of Engineers, manage the spill
program."' However, the Council did indicate that the ninety
percent survival rate does not include fish transported by truck or
barge,' 21 and that the spill program is to operate regardless of any
impacts on firm hydropower.2 8
The results of the 1986 amendments were discouraging to
fishery advocates. Although it purported to recognize the uncertain nature of the biological and economic estimates of its models,
the Council nevertheless seemed to rely heavily on them in rejecting the fishery agency and tribal request to increase spills. By
John Day. Id. at 27.
124. Id. at 37-39 (discussing the Corps' FISHPASS model).
125. Id. at 25.
126. Id. at 39-41 (noting the Corps' allegations that it "has no [legal] authority to submit to binding arbitration or mediation" in providing spill and cannot
"delegate responsibility for its operation and management decisions" to the fishery agencies and tribes). The Council did call upon the fishery agencies and tribes
to develop "spill criteria" to "guide" the Corps. These criteria are to identify the
typical spring and summer periods during which eighty percent of juvenile fish
migrate, daily hours of spill, and the number of fish that will trigger spill operations. Id. at 5.
127. By adopting the fishery agency and tribal recommendation to apply the
survival standard only to fish not transported by truck or barge, id. at 26, the
Council refused to allow higher survival rates of transported fish to offset lower
survival rates of in-river migrants. The Corps has always favored transportation
(since it eliminates the need for fish flows and spills that conflict with power operations), but the fishery agencies and tribes are skeptical, alleging that transported
fish (especially spring chinook) are subjected to stress that reduces their survival
rates after they are released in the river below the dams. See, e.g., id. at 31.
128. Id. at 4. Prior to the 1986 amendments, the Corps provided spill only
when nonfirm energy was available. Id. at 18. The Council rejected arguments by
BPA's Direct Service Industries (mostly aluminum smelters) that the Council's
spill proposal would jeopardize the reliability of the hydroelectric system, and that
a formal cost-benefit analysis was the proper test to evaluate alternative approaches to improve fish survival. Id. at 28-30. On the inappropriateness of employing cost-benefit analysis in the Columbia Basin Program, see Parity II, supra
note 26, at 135-39, 143-56; Lothrop, The Misplaced Role of Cost-Benefit Analysis
in Columbia Basin Fishery Mitigation, 16 ENVTL. L. 517 (1986).
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refusing to increase interim spill levels, the Council also appeared
to reject the biological expertise of the fishery agencies and tribes,
a result Congress cautioned against.129 Moreover, if in fact a
ninety percent survival standard supplies no protection above
pre-Northwest Power Act operations,130 the standard may violate
section 4(h)(6)(E)(ii) of the Act, which requires the Columbia Basin Program to include measures that will "improve" survival of
fish bypassing dams.131 Because the 1986 amendments were only
interim in nature, the fishery agencies and tribes are unlikely to
seek judicial review of the Council's decision, but will continue to
press for improved spill during the program's regular amendment
process, already underway as this Article is prepared for publication.' 32 If these efforts do not succeed, the first five years of the
Columbia Basin Program will have produced no substantial improvement in mainstem dam juvenile fish passage.

VI.

PROGRAM CHALLENGES: THREATS TO SUCCESSFUL PROGRAM
IMPLEMENTATION

Because so much of its implementation rests in the hands of
federal water project operators and regulators whose past actions
are a principal cause for the depleted condition of the Columbia's
salmon runs,' 33 there are numerous potential threats to program
implementation. True, the program may benefit from exogenous
events like the recent ratification of the United States-Canada
Salmon Interception Treaty,1 3 4 or a new five-year negotiated plan
129. Section 4(h)(7) of the Northwest Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(7), requires the Council to give "due weight" to the expertise of the fishery agencies
and tribes in formulating the Columbia Basin Program. However, the Council argued that the fishery agency and tribal spill proposal was not a "recommendation
that triggers all the procedural requirements of the Northwest Power Act. See, for
example, Section 4(h)(7)." 1986 AMENDMENTS, supra note 123, at 19. Nevertheless,
by rejecting on biological grounds a standard advocated by the fishery agencies
and tribes, the Council seemed to be acting as a "super" fish and wildlife agency, a
result specifically disapproved in the Act's legislative history. 126 CONG. REC.
H10,683 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Dingell).
130. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
131. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(6)(E)(ii).
132. The deadline for recommendations for 1987 program amendments was
February 18, 1986; the Council will amend the program within one year of this
deadline.
133. See generally Hydropower vs. Salmon, supra note 20.
134. See Jensen, supra note 2; Lawrence, U.S.-Canada Treaty: New Hope for
Pacific Salmon, Nw. ENERGY NEWS, Jan.-Feb. 1985, at 16-17; see also Wilkinson &
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for allocating Columbia River harvests between the treaty and
non-treaty fishery,' 3 5 but many other unresolved issues threaten
successful program implementation. Many of these issues are in
court or on administrative appeal, and their results may facilitate
program implementation, frustrate expeditious action, or illustrate the need for congressional amendments. This section
surveys those issues.
A.

Seattle Master Builders v. Northwest Power Planning
Council: Is the Council Constitutional?

Until April 10, 1986, the most ominous cloud hovering over
the Columbia Basin Program was this suit, because in it the Seattle Master Builders attacked not only the model conservation
standards the Council promulgated as part of its Northwest Conservation and Electric Power Plan," 6 but also the constitutionalConner, supra note 1, at 56-61; Conner, The Troubled Pacific Salmon Treaty:
Why it Must be Ratified, [1974-Present Transfer Binder] 24 OCEAN L. MEMO
(OCEAN AND COASTAL L. CENTER) (Sept. 1983).
135. See Harrison, The Evolution of a New Comprehensive Plan For Managing Columbia River Anadromous Fish 16 ENVTL. L. 705 (1986); Heinemann & Rosenbaum, Securing A Fair Share: Indian Treaty Rights And The "Comprehensive" Plan for the Columbia River [1979-Present Transfer Binder] 21
ANADROMOUS FISH L. MEMO (NAT. RESOURCES L. INST.) 1-11 (Mar. 1983). It is not
altogether clear how any production goals established as a result of this comprehensive plan should affect production goals of the Columbia Basin Program. For
one thing, the former goals will be the product of an extremely confidential negotiation process, while the latter will he produced through the Northwest Power
Act's "open process" approach to decision making. For another, production goals
set by harvest managers may be considerably lower than those established by the
Northwest Power Planning Council. The harvest managers' overriding concern of
fairly allocating harvests over the next five years should produce conservative run
size estimates that would be inappropriate for use as restoration goals.
136. The Northwest Power Act required the Council to include model conservation standards in its Northwest Conservation and Electric Power Plan. 16
U.S.C. § 839b(e)(3)(A) (1982). The Act required these standards to apply to (1)
new and existing structures, (2) utility, customer, and governmental conservation
programs, and (3) other consumer-conservation actions and be "designed to produce power savings that are cost effective to the region and economically feasible
for consumers." Id. § 839b(f)(1). It also authorized the Council to recommend to
BPA a surcharge to be imposed upon BPA customers failing to meet the model
conservation standards; the amount of the surcharge is to reflect the additional
costs imposed upon BPA by the failure to achieve the projected energy savings
attributable to the standards, but must be at least 10% and not more than 50% of
BPA's rates. Id. § 839b(f)(2).
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ity of the Council. The Master Builders argued that the Appointments Clause of the Constitution,13 7 as interpreted by the
Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo, required Council members to
be appointed by the President because the Council exercised "significant authority" under federal law.' 3s The Council contended
that Appointments Clause restrictions should not apply to inter3 9 citing numerous examples of
state compact agencies like itself,1
Congress' giving non-federal entities significant authority over
federal agencies.' °
Although urged to avoid the constitutional issue by the
The 1983 Northwest Conservation and Electric Power Plan made conservation the centerpiece of its regional energy blueprint and model conservation standards for new residential and commercial structures the cornerstone of its conservation program. See 1 NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, NORTHWEST

10-9 to 10-11, 10-13 to 10-14 (1983).
The Council estimated that these model standards would save the region an average of 14% (under its high growth scenario) to 36% (low growth scenario) of new
electric supplies over the next 20 years (also assuming the per home cost to meet
the standard for new residential homes to range from $2400 to $4500, depending
on the climate zone, but concluding that a home meeting the standard would cost
less to own and operate over its lifetime than one built to current standards). See
Northwest Power Planning Council, Nw. ENERGY NEWS, Mar.-Apr. 1983, at 6-8;
see also Eckman & Watson, Model Conservation Standards for New Construction: The Region's Best Buy, 1 Nw. ENVTL. J. no. 1 at 23 (1984).
137. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2: "[The President] shall nominate, and by
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided
for, and which shall be established by Law; but the Congress may by law vest the
Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President
alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments."
138. 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (ruling that the Appointments Clause prevented
Congress from appointing members of the Federal Election Commission because
they exerted "significant authority under federal law").
139. Brief for Respondent Northwest Power Planning Council at 63-72, Seattle Master Bldrs. v. Northwest Power Planning Council, 786 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir.
1986) see Hemmingway, supra note 32, at 682-89.
140. See, e.g., § 401(d) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1341(d) (1982)
(forbidding the issuance of any federal license to projects affecting waters under
the jurisdiction of the Clean Water Act without state certification of compliance
with water quality standards "and any other appropriate requirement of state law
. ."); see also
. Northwest Power Planning Council, Nw. ENERGY NEWS, May-June
1985, at 2 (describing Oregon Attorney General Dave Frohnmayer's oral argument
in Master Builders, in which he noted that virtually all federal programs for child
support, highways, education, and employment are administered by state officials
not subject to the federal appointment power).
CONSERVATION AND ELECTRIC POWER PLAN
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United States Justice Department,1 4 1 on April 10, 1986 the Ninth
Circuit upheld both the Council's model conservation standards
and its constitutionality. 4 " The court ruled that (1) the Council is
in fact an interstate compact agency, (2) whether promulgation of
the model conservation standards constituted "significant authority" over the federal BPA is irrelevant to determining the constitutionality of the Council, because (3) the Appointments Clause
applies only to federal officials, not officials like the Council whose powers are "state derived."' 4 Despite a vigorous
141. See Brief for Intervenor-Respondent the United States of America at 813, Seattle Master Bldrs. v. Northwest Power Planning Council, 786 F.2d 1359
(9th Cir, 1986) [hereinafter cited as Federal Brief] referring to the Appointments
Clause as "a difficult constitutional issue;" and noting that the surcharge penalty
for failing to adopt the model conservation standards was only a recommendation
to BPA, not sufficient to constitute an exercise of "significant authority" for Appointments Clause purposes). However, the federal brief conceded that two other
provisions of the Northwest Power Act raise Appointments Clause issues: the
Act's preclusion of increases in BPA industrial power sales without a determination by the Council of consistency with its plan, 16 U.S.C. § 839c(d)(3); and the
requirement that BPA obtain congressional approval for acquisition of major resources that are inconsistent with the Council's plan. 16 U.S.C. § 839d(c)(3). The
federal brief also disputed the Council's allegation that the Appointments Clause
is directed only at preventing congressional arrogation of Executive power, alleging that "the Framers had a clear intent to preclude state as well as congressional
power." Federal Brief, supra, at 18-19 (citing a motion defeated at the Constitutional Convention that would have allowed appointments to be made by "the Legislatures or Executives of the several states," a statement by Governeur Morris,
and Federalist Papers Nos. 15 and 16).
The precedential significance of the case is reflected in the number of "friend
of the court" briefs filed in the case. In addition to the federal brief, briefs in
support of the Council were filed by the States of California, Oregon, Idaho,
Washington, and Montana, the City of Tacoma, and the National Governors Association. On the other hand, the Master Builders' position was supported by the
Pacific Legal Foundation.
142. 786 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir. 1986). In affirming the Council's model conservation standards, the court gave deference to the Council's statutory interpretation
because it was a contemporaneous construction by an entity charged with implementing a statute whose provisions were "untried and new." Id. at 1366. ("The
preparation and consideration of the plan is a matter within Council authority
over which the Act accords the Council considerable flexibility." Id.at 1367). As a
result, the court deferred to the Council's interpretations of "cost effective" conservation measures that are "economically feasible for consumers." Id. at 1368-69.
Finally, the court found that the Council's decision to derive the standards from
computer simulation models, rather than conducting component field testing, was
not arbitrary and capricious. Id. at 1370 (noting the technical nature of these
decisions).
143. Id. at 1363 (Congress rejected a federal agency because it wanted the
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dissent, 44 the Ninth Circuit's result seems sound, since the purpose of the Appointments Clause is to prevent congressional appointment of executive officials, not to inhibit innovative means
of structuring federal-state relations.' 46
Nevertheless, as this Article goes to press, it seems quite
likely that the United States Supreme Court will be asked to review the case, and given the spate of recent cases involving similar issues, 146 the Court may well choose this case to clarify the
Council to represent state concerns, and chose a Compact because it wanted to
avoid conflicts with state law and to maintain accountability through federal substantive and procedural law); id. at 1364 ("The federal government can be subject
to state law where there is a clear congressional mandate and specific legislation
which makes authorization of state control clear and unambiguous."); id. at 1365
("Because Congress neither appoints nor removes the members of this Council,
the balance of powers between Congress and the President is unaffected.")
144. The dissent asserted that even if the Council were an interstate compact
agency, the Appointments Clause restrictions still applied: "members of interstate
compact agencies are not exempt from the Appointments Clause." Id. at 1373.
According to Judge Beezer, if the Council met the Buckley test of exerting significant authority under federal law, its members had to satisfy the Appointments
Clause:
Congressional authority would be enhanced at the expense of the executive
if Congress had the unrestricted power to confer the appointment authority
on third parties. To the extent that a governor can appoint a member of an
interstate compact agency who would otherwise be subject to the Appointments Clause, the power of the executive branch is diminished.
Id. at 1374. The dissent had little difficulty concluding that the Northwest Power
Act gave the Council significant authority over BPA. Id. at 1375-76 (citing the
Council's authority to promulgate a plan with which BPA must be consistent, review BPA actions for consistency with the plan, block major resource acquisitions
or conservation measures inconsistent with the plan, approve new sales to BPA's
direct service industrial customers, and recommend imposition of electric rate
surcharges on BPA customers not meeting model conservation standards).
145. See Parity III, supra note 6, at 357-58 n.333 (Council members are not
"Officers of the United States;" therefore, Appointments Clause restrictions do
not apply); see also Goble, The Council and the Constitution: A Note on the
Northwest Power Planning Council and the Property Clause, 1 J. OF ENvTL. L. &
LITIGATION (forthcoming, 1986) (arguing that under the property clause of the
United States Constitution, art. IV, § 3, cl.2, Congress has sufficient authority to
subordinate federal property managers to non-federal entities).
146. See Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374 (D.D.C. 1986) aff'd sub
nom. Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986) (declaring the automatic deficit
reduction provisions of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act
of 1985 unconstitutional for vesting executive power to prescribe federal budget
reductions in the Comptroller General, an officer removable by Congress); cf.
Ameron v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 787 F.2d 875 (3d Cir. 1986) (upholding
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relationship of the Appointments Clause to federal-state relations. If the Court were to reverse the Ninth Circuit, the Northwest Power Act provides a means to establish a federally designated Council, appointed by the Secretary of Energy.147 Federally
appointed Council members would not necessarily be the same as
the current Council members, and perhaps the new Council
would have to reapprove both the Northwest Conservation and
Electric Power Plan and the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife
Program. Federal appointment could prove to be a significant
blow to fish and wildlife restoration efforts, could certainly delay
those efforts, and would eliminate an attractive model of federalstate relations on which other natural resources programs might
be based.
B. Pacific Intertie Power Sales: Is Program Compliance a
Condition to CaliforniaPower Sales?
One of the chief weaknesses of the Northwest Power Act is
its relative silence as to how the programs it calls for are to be
implemented. This is a particularly telling weakness in view of
the numerous institutional entities with program implementation
responsibilities. Beyond the constitutional authority of the Council itself, perhaps the most important issue is whether compliance
with the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program and the
Northwest Conservation and Electric Power Plan ought to be a
condition for gaining access to BPA's Intertie lines, which connect
the Northwest (and British Columbia) to the large California
electricity market."18 Because the Northwest has a significant
the automatic stay provisions of the Competition in Contracting Act, determining
that the Comptroller General performs significant executive functions and is not
an exclusive agent of Congress, despite the congressional power of removal).
147. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(b).

148. The Pacific Intertie, also referred to as the Northwest/Southwest Intertie, actually consists of three lines: a direct current line and two alternating cur-

rent lines. Originally rated at 3400 megawatts when the lines were completed in
1968 and 1970, the Intertie has since been upgraded to around 4750 megawatts.
More than 2000 billion kilowatt hours of energy, worth over one billion dollars,
have been transmitted over the Intertie since 1968. Northwest Power Planning
Council, Nw. ENERGY NEWS, July-Aug. 1983, at 1, 12.
In California, the Intertie lines are owned by Pacific Gas and Electric and
Southern California Edison (total of 60%); the cities of Los Angeles, Burbank,
Pasadena, and Glendale (total of 21%); and San Diego Gas and Electric, the California Department of Water Resources, and the Western Area Power Administra-
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electric surplus for the foreseeable future, " 9 utilities and federal
marketing entities are quite eager to sell as much of the surplus
as possible outside of the region. 50 Since the Intertie lines provide the only access to the southern markets, there is considerable interest in the conditions under which access to those lines
may be obtained.' 5' Similarly, there is considerable interest in in52
creasing the capacity of the lines themselves.1
Conditioning Intertie access on compliance with the Columbia Basin Program would provide a powerful incentive for any
generating utility or federal project operator to comply (and
maintain compliance) with the program. Without such an incentive, these entities are likely to continue their old habits of discovering reasons why fish and wildlife restoration cannot proceed
expeditiously.' 53 Under a Near Term Intertie Access Policy
adopted by BPA,' 54 there is no assurance that projects inconsistion (total of 19%). Id. at 11-12. In the Northwest, BPA and Portland Gas and
Electric built Intertie lines, while Pacific Power and Light has a priority right to
deliveries of a certain amount of energy. Northwest Conservation Act Coalition,
Nw. CONSERVATION AcT REP., July 22, 1985, at 6.
149. The Northwest Power Planning Council's latest estimate is that if BPA
does not have to serve substantial new investor-owned utility loads, conservation
alone should be sufficient to meet the needs of BPA's current customers during
the next 20 years - unless the region experiences an unlikely high growth scenario. Even under the high scenario, no new thermal plant acquisitions would be
necessary during the next 20 years, since conservation, hydropower, cogeneration,
and "nonfirm" strategies would be sufficient to meet load growth. 1 NORTHWEST
POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, NORTHWEST CONSERVATION

AND

ELECTRIC POWER PLAN

8-9 to 8-10 (1986).
150. See Northwest Power Planning Council, Nw. ENERGY NEWS, July-Aug.
1983, at 15 (describing utility industry hopes of selling 1500 average annual megawatts in 15-year contracts); BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ISSUE

ALERT -

SELLING SOUTH: BPA SEEKS WAYS OF MARKETING SURPLUS POWER TO

(Sept. 1985).
151. See Northwest Conservation Act Coalition, Nw. CONSERVATION ACT REP.,

THE PACIFIC SOUTHWEST

Dec. 24, 1984, at 7 (describing the issue of conditioning Intertie access as a "contentious question").
152. See Northwest Conservation Act Coalition, Nw. CONSERVATION ACT REP.,

July 22, 1985, at 5-7. (describing plans to upgrade the existing lines and to build a
fourth line).
153. For a sampling of the obstacles allegedly inhibiting fish and wildlife protection and restoration, see Parity III, supra note 6, at 352 n. 312.
154. Bonneville Power Admin., U.S. Dep't of Energy, Near Term Intertie Ac-

cess Policy, 50 Fed. Reg. 26,827-833 (1985). The Near Term Policy replaced an
Interim Intertie Access Policy, 49 Fed. Reg. 44,232-38 (1984), and will be in effect

until September 30, 1986. The City of Los Angeles unsuccessfully challenged
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tent with the program would be denied Intertie access. The BPA
Near Term Policy exempts federal projects, places the burden of
taking action on BPA, and enables non-compliers to maintain Intertie access if they compensate (in unspecified ways) for the
costs they impose because of their non-compliance.' 55 These constraints make the BPA policy an unworkable one. 56 Although the
Northwest Power Planning Council established some general
guidelines for BPA's Long Term Access Policy (scheduled for
adoption on October 1, 1986), those provisions failed even to
mention Columbia Basin Program compliance.157 Unless the
Council seizes the opportunity to employ the issue of Intertie access as means to facilities enforcement of its program, 58 noncomBPA's interim policy as inhibiting free market forces of supply and demand in
Department of Water and Power of the City of Los Angeles v. BPA, 759 F.2d 684,
693 (9th Cir. 1985) (pointing out that electricity generation, transmission, and distribution in the Pacific Northwest has not been subject to free market forces since
1937).
155. BPA Near Term Policy, supra note 154, §§ II.C.3.c, II.C.7.e, 50 Fed. Reg.
26,829-830 (1985). See BPA Intertie Access Policy Shortchanges Fish and Wildlife [1979-Present Transfer Binder], 28 ANADROMOUS FISH L. MEMO (NAT. RESOURcES L. INST.) 8-9 (Sept. 1984) (criticizing BPA's draft interim policy, which
contained substantially similar fish and wildlife conditions).
156. See, e.g., Letter of Dale Evans, National Marine Fisheries Services Division Chief, to James Jones, Bonneville Power Admin. Deputy Power Manager, at 2
(Feb. 10, 1986) (concluding that "BPA's existing fishery conditions for the NearTerm Intertie Access Policy ... are neither adequate nor enforceable").
157. See 1 NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, NORTHWEST CONSERVATION
AND ELECTRIC POWER PLAN 9-22 (1986). Under § 4(h)(10)(A) of the Northwest
Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(10)(A), BPA's fund and its authorities must be
exercised in a manner consistent with the Columbia Basin Program and the Council's Northwest Conservation and Electric Power Plan. See also COLUMBIA BASIN

PROGRAM, supra note 4, § 1304(a)(3) (listing intertie arrangements as among those
activities which must be consistent with the program).
158. A Council Issue Paper on Intertie Access somehow managed not to mention Columbia Basin Program compliance at all, alleging that fish and wildlife
issues related to intertie access are "already treated" in § 1304(a)(3) of the Columbia Basin Program. NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, ISSUE PAPER ON INTERTIE ACCESS (Mar. 5, 1985). Actually, § 1304(a)(3) merely lists Intertie arrangements among those actions which must be "consistent" with the program - it
establishes no fish and wildlife policy on Intertie access. In comments on BPA's
developing "Long Term Intertie Access Policy," the Council simply reiterated that
"intertie access should be conditioned upon consistency with the Council's power
plan and fish and wildlife program." See Northwest Conservation Act Coalition,
Nw. CONSERVATION ACT REP., Dec. 24, 1984, at 7 (quoting the Council).

Another Council issue paper examined some effects of changing the hydroelectric system's chief operating assumption, critical water year planning, on power
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plying federal and nonfederal projects will continue to benefit
from the region's interconnection with California.
The pressing need to resolve the question of Intertie access is
illustrated by a January 28, 1986 proposal to sell surplus firm
power to Southern California Edison in twenty year contracts. 59
The BPA proposal does not mention the issue of what fish and
wildlife conditions the contract should include. Neither does it
suggest whether the Near Term Intertie Access Policy 0 would
govern the contract conditions throughout its twenty-year term, if
that policy is replaced by a Long Term Policy after the contract
is executed. Nor does the proposal promise an Environmental Impact Statement to examine such questions.'' In fact, the proposal
production but gave little attention as to how any changes might produce increased fishery protection, see infra note 201.
159. See BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ISSUE UPDATE-SELLING SOUTH:

BPA

PROPOSES A SALE OF SURPLUS POWER TO SOUTHERN

CALIFORNIA EDISON (Jan. 1986) [hereinafter cited as BPA-EDISON PROPOSAL]. As
proposed, the contract would begin October 1, 1987, would entitle Edison to deliveries of between 250 and 500 megawatts, and would be sold initially at a rate of
3.7 cents per kilowatt hour (subject to escalator clauses in subsequent years),
guaranteeing BPA at least $43 million during the first year of the contract. However, the proposal anticipates converting the power sale contract into an exchange
contract if BPA dissipates the current power surplus (supra note 149) during the
20-year life of the contract. This exchange provision, under which Edison would
return power to BPA (instead of dollars) in the winter is probably required by the
Northwest Preference Act, 16 U.S.C. § 837 (1982), which reserves for Northwest
utilities a preference to BPA power, see Blumm, Risk Management and Northwest Electric Power Planning: Some Lessons From the Rearview Mirror, 13
ENVTL. L. 739, 771 nn.138-39 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Risk Management Lessons]; but see BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN., OFFICE OF POWER AND RESOURCES
MGMT., ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT ON FIRM DISPLACEMENT RATE

3 (Feb. 1986)

(describing a new BPA power sale arrangement apparently designed to allow sales
of surplus firm power to California utilities without the recall provisions required
by the Northwest Preference Act).
160. See supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
161. The proposal does indicate that BPA will prepare an "Environmental
Assessment" to see if the proposed sale would have any significant environmental
effects." BPA-EDISON PROPOSAL, supra note 159, at 6. Whether an Environmental
Assessment would satisfy the National Environmental Policy Act (see infra note
248 on the purpose of an assessment), given the contract's long-term commitment
of electric resources, is unclear. The Ninth Circuit has recently placed considerable weight on the length of contract and license terms in deciding whether an
Environmental Impact Statement is necessary. See Confederated Tribes and
Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation v. FERC, 746 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 105 S.Ct. 2358 (1985) (40-year relicense of the Rock Island Dam requires
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fails even to hint that the sale might have fishery effects, alleging
that the Northwest "has a surplus [of power] in the warm
months.' 62 That "surplus," however, has failed to prevent project operators from continuously rejecting fishery agency and tri6 3
bal requests for spill to facilitate downstream fish passage.1
Moreover, as the next section demonstrates, during 1985 that
"surplus" was insufficient to regularly meet Water Budget
flows. 6 4 Until biologically sound fishery flow and spill provisions
are implemented, 6 5 the wisdom of twenty-year power export contracts will remain suspect.
C.

Water Budget Implementation: The Disappointing Track
Record

Heralded as the centerpiece of the Columbia Basin Program
when it was first approved in 1982, the Water Budget' 6 has thus
far failed to produce its promised fundamental shift in hydroelectric system planning and operating priorities. That was the conclusion of the Water Budget Managers in their report on the 1984
season, 6 7 the first season the Water Budget was technically in effect.' Their report on the following season was similarly discouran EIS), analyzed in Blumm, A Trilogy of Tribes v. FERC: Reforming the Federal Role in Hydroelectric Licensing, 10 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 34-46 (1986)
[hereinafter cited as A Trilogy of Tribes v. FERC]; Forelaws on Board v. Johnson,
743 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1984) (BPA's 20-year power sale contract requires an EIS,
despite BPA's claim of insufficient time due to a statutory deadline), analyzed in
Blumm, NEPA Meets the Northwest Power Act (And Prevails): Ninth Circuit
Orders an EIS on the Bonneville Power Administration's Power Sale Contracts,
25 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1005 (1985).
162. BPA-EDISON PROPOSAL, supra note 159, at 3.
163. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
164. See infra notes 181-85, 191-92 and accompanying text.
165. The Northwest Power Act emphasizes biologically sound results, even if
they require increased economic costs. See 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(6)(C) (cheaper cost
alternative relevant only where it will achieve the "same sound biological objective"); Parity II, supra note 26, at 131-39.
166. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
167. WATER BUDGET CENTER, 1984 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE NORTHWEST
POWER PLANNING COUNCIL AND BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION 59-60 (1984)

[hereinafter cited as 1984

WATER BUDGET CENTER REPORT]

("this resistance to

change, to adapt to the new realities brought on by the Congressional mandate of
the Act, must be countered at all levels if significant improvement in the status of
the fishery resource is to be realized").
168. During 1983 BPA, the Corps, and the Bureau of Reclamation managed
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aging, concluding "1985 cannot be viewed as a good year. Flows
and spill in the system were minimal a great portion of the time,"
largely because BPA, the Corps, and the Idaho Power Company
considered marketing secondary energy and reservoir refill to take
precedence over fishery needs."' 9
The Water Budget is a volume of water made available to the
Water Budget Managers (appointed to represent the fish and
wildlife agencies and Indian tribes) from April 15 to June 15 each
year. 170 The program calls for Budget flows to be "shaped" by the
Managers "to provide maximum juvenile salmon survival" subject
to three constraints: firm power flows, other firm non-power requirements like flood control, and physical conditions.1 7 ' However, the program's clear elevation of Water Budget flows over
reservoir refill and secondary power sale considerations 72 has
been frequently ignored or evaded by the federal operating

agencies. 178
While a 1985 agreement between the fishery agencies, tribes,
and project operators resolved some Water Budget implementation problems on the mid-Columbia,' 7 4 Water Budget flows have
to delay implementation by claiming they had to assess the environmental effects
of Water Budget implementation under National Environmental Policy Act procedures. See Parity III, supra note 6, at 296-97.
169. 1985 WATER BUDGET CENTER REPORT, supra note 114, at 8.

170.

COLUMBIA BASIN PROGRAM,

supra note 4, §§ 304(a) and (b).

171. Id. § 304(a)(1).
172. Id. § 304(a)(8).
173. See Water Budget Undermined by Corps and BPA, [1979-Present
Transfer Binder], 27 ANADROMOUS FISH L. MEMO (NAT. RESOURCES L. INST.) 9-10
(Aug. 1984) (describing the Water Budget Managers' complaint that during 1984
the Corps of Engineers and BPA elevated reservoir refill and secondary power
sales over Water Budget flows, altered firm power flows without notice, and failed
to explain in writing numerous departures from requested Water Budget flows);
1985 WATER BUDGET CENTER REPORT, supra note 114, at 2-3, 8 (secondary power
sales and reservoir refill continued to predominate in 1985).
174. See Donaldson Letter, supra note 118, at 2 (challenging the Corps' assertion that the 1984 Water Budget was fully successful, but noting that in 1985 the
operating agreement resolved fishery agency and tribal concerns on the mid-Columbia). However, as the 1985 season progressed, even on the mid-Columbia the
Water Budget Managers encountered increasing difficulty securing fish flows because of BPA's aggressive marketing of secondary power. See infra notes 190-91
and accompanying text; Lothrop, supra note 15, at 6 (noting that "shaping and
accounting" problems, infra note 190, continue to hamper mid-Columbia flows).
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never been supplied consistently on the Snake,'175 even though the
flows in the Council's program are twenty-five percent lower than
those deemed biologically necessary by the region's fishery agencies.' 76 Storage is quite limited in the Snake Basin, where sixtyfive percent of the runoff is uncontrolled. 177 When natural runoff
is insufficient to meet prescribed Water Budget flows, storage
water must be released either from the Corps of Engineers' Dworshak Dam on the Clearwater River or from Idaho Power Company's Brownlee Dam on the mainstem Snake. However, Idaho
Power has refused to commit to any storage releases that might
jeopardize refill, 178 and the Water Budget Managers estimated a
proposed "trial operating agreement" would increase the
probability of meeting Water Budget flows by only thirteen percent over natural runoff. 17 9 Water Budget flows are met by natural flows sixty percent of the time, and the agreement would increase this probability to seventy-three percent. The managers
conclude that, if this agreement represents the extent to which
the power system will accommodate fishery flows, the Water
Budget on the Snake River will not be met in low water years. 80
During the 1985 Water Budget, the Water Budget Managers
reported twelve consecutive days of Snake flows below the fishery
minimum of eighty-five thousand cubic feet per second (kcfs), in175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 181-88.
See Parity III, supra note 6, at 294-95.
1984 WATER BUDGET CENTER REPORT, supra note 167, at 7.
Id. at 14; 1985 WATER BUDGET CENTER REPORT, supra note 114, at 2.
1984 WATER BUDGET CENTER REPORT, supra note 167, at 14-15. This trial

agreement apparently has never been implemented. In May 1985, the fishery
agencies questioned the Corps' mention of an alleged Idaho Power "draft" Water
Budget implementation procedure for Brownlee, claiming that they had yet to see
such a document. Donaldson Letter, supra note 118, at 2. The Northwest Power
Planning Council reported on August 5, 1985 that no agreement on Idaho Power's
Water Budget obligations had been reached. Chrisman Memorandum, supra note
84, at 2.
Not all problems on the Snake are attributable to Idaho Power recalcitrance,
however. Two weeks after the formal end of the 1985 Water Budget period, BPA
requested that the Corps implement a "zero flow operation," presumably because
of light electric loads, despite substantial numbers of migrating fish and very high
water temperatures. Fortunately, at the request of the Water Budget Managers,
the Corps denied BPA's request. See Water Budget Center, BI-WEEKLY REP., June
29-July 12, 1985.
180. 1984 WATER BUDGET CENTER REPORT, supra note 167, at 14-15.
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cluding a low of fifty-three kcfs on April 28.181 These low flows,
caused by an erroneous high runoff forecast, 182 occurred at the
height of the spring chinook migration and indicate that the operators of Dworshak and Brownlee are either reluctant (in the case
of the Corps"8 3 ) or unwilling (in the case of Idaho Power) to tap
storage to maintain flows when natural runoff is low. 84 The unhappy result was that during a twenty-six day period in 1985
(April 22-May 17) flows at Lower Granite Dam met the fishery
minimum only six days. 85 In their report on the 1985 season, the
Water Budget Managers concluded that meeting the Columbia
181. 1985 WATER BUDGET CENTER REPORT, supra note 114, at 1; see also
Water Budget Center, BI-WEEKLY REP. Apr. 27-May 3, 1985. The extreme low flow
of April 28 was caused by BPA refilling Lower Granite reservoir for power pur-

poses. 1985

WATER BUDGET CENTER REPORT,

supra note 114, at 2.

182. The forecasted high runoff caused the Corps to keep reservoir levels at
Dworshak and Brownlee low for flood control purposes. When the high runoff did
not occur, both the Corps and Idaho Power Company became more concerned
about refilling the reservoirs than satisfying fishery needs. See 1985 WATER
BUDGET CENTER REPORT,

supra note 114, at 2.

183. The Corps restricted drafts of Dworshak Dam to outflows not exceeding
an average of 10 kcfs over a 31-day period (or not more than 0.6 million acre-feet),
meaning that Water Budget flows cannot be supplied in some years. The alleged
basis for this restriction is a June 28, 1983 Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact on its Water Budget implementation responsibilities,
in which the Corps apparently concluded that the non-power impacts of releases
greater than 10 kcfs per day would be "significant," thus requiring preparation of
an Environmental Impact Statement. The fishery agencies responded that the
Water Budget ought to be met every year and, if the Corps thinks an EIS is necessary, it ought to proceed with one, meeting the prescribed Water Budget flows in
the interim. The fishery agencies asserted that this Dworshak restriction "represents a non-power constraint which was not in existence at the time the Water
Budget was considered and adopted by the Northwest Power Planning Council."
Donaldson Letter, supra note 118, at 2.
During the 1985 season, the Corps continued to restrict drafts of Dworshak
reservoir to 10 kcfs. Even this small contribution was done only on a day-to-day
basis and only when it would not jeopardize refill. 1985 WATER BUDGET CENTER
REPORT, supra note 114, at 2.
184. Idaho Power refused to provide fish flows from Brownlee because it
claimed that the Corps, which is responsible for flood control at all reservoirs (not
simply those the Corps operates), ordered reservoir drawdowns on the basis of its
erroneous runoff forecast, supra note 182 and accompanying text. According to
Idaho Power, these flood control operations negated any flexibility it might have
had to supply fish flows because of the utility's overriding concern to refill the
reservoir. Water Budget Center, WEEKLY REP., Apr. 29-May 3, 1985.

185. 1985

WATER BUDGET CENTER REPORT,

supra note 114, at 2; see also

Water Budget Center, WEEKLY REP., May 11-17, 1985.
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Basin Program's prescribed Snake River fish flows will require (1)
recognition by the project operators of the program's priorities of
placing fishery needs ahead of secondary power marketing and
reservoir refill,' 86 and (2) a change in the Corps' "overly conservative" forecasting method establishing flood control operations.' 7
The managers might also have mentioned that the Snake River
runs would benefit considerably from a more cooperative attitude
on the part of Idaho Power Company, surely one of the most recalcitrant of the region's utilities to contribute to anadromous fish
restoration efforts.' 88
On the Columbia, where there is considerably more storage
(only eight percent of the runoff is uncontrolled 88 ), some implementation problems have been overcome by a negotiated "Coordinated Plan of Operation."'8 0 However, other problems persist.
186. See COLUMBIA BASIN
187. 1985 WATER BUDGET

PROGRAM, supra
CENTER REPORT,

note 4, § 304(a)(8).
supra note 114, at 2; cf. Lothrop,

supra note 15, at 6 (same suggestion).
188. After all, it was Idaho Power's dams which terminated anadromous fish
access to the middle and upper Snake Basin, despite assurances to the contrary,
see, e.g., Hydropower vs. Salmon, supra note 20 at 239-41. For a typical example
of Idaho Power's recalcitrance, see supra note 184 and accompanying text.
189. 1984 WATER BUDGET CENTER REPORT, supra note 167, at 7.
190. For a time this plan, agreed to by the fishery agencies and tribes, the
Corps, BPA, the Mid-Columbia Public Utility Districts, and the Bureau of Reclamation, helped to overcome two problems which plagued Water Budget implementation in 1984: how to "shape" Water Budget flows, and how to "account" for
Water Budget usage. This "shaping" issue concerns whether BPA and the Corps
may vary requested flows to maximize power sales, which, prior to 1985, produced
high flows during the week (when power demands are high) and very low flows on
weekends (when power demands are low). Such fluctuations, which adversely affect fish migration, were reduced in the 1985 plan by a requirement that weekend
flows be maintained at a level averaging no less than 80% of the previous five day
average flows.
The accounting issue involves the question of whether the rate of Water
Budget usage ,should be measured by (1) the difference between the flows requested by the Water Budget Center and the power base flows set in § 304 of the
program, or (2) the difference between the actual flows and the power base flows.
BPA and the Corps favor the latter method, but the Water Budget Center contends that this charges the Water Budget account with flows released for secondary power sales and "spends" the Budget quickly, leaving no flow augmentation to
assist fish migration in the late spring. The 1985 agreement included a compromise in which the operators agreed to meet flows requested by Water Budget
Managers within specific limits for a 45-day period.
The "shaping" and "accounting" problems remain unresolved and may continue to cause problems for fish migration on the mid-Columbia; see Lothrop,
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In particular, there remain questions about the capability of the
Water Budget to adapt to biological realities. For example, a protracted 1985 migration (extending into the second week of June)
caused the Water Budget Managers to request outflows from
Grand Coulee Dam sufficient to maintain 130 kcfs on the midColumbia through June 15. This request led to an agreement between the Bureau of Reclamation (the project operator), BPA,
the Corps, and the Water Budget Managers to maintain a flow of
130 kcfs. Unfortunately, BPA failed to adjust its power marketing
accordingly, and the flows fell below 130 kcfs during the first
twelve days of June.' 9 ' Consequently, the Water Budget Managers concluded, "[iun retrospect, for 1985, it appears that BPA and
the secondary power market may have benefited a great deal from
the 'new approach' to Water Budget management. However, BPA
did not attempt to use system flexibility to meet unanticipated
fishery needs. 1 9 2 The managers recommended that future BPA
actions, including expansion of the Pacific Intertie, be carefully
analyzed to determine their effect on the flexibility of the system
to meet fishery needs. 93 In addition to problems regarding flows
for fish passage, there remain problems with supplying flows to
protect spawning salmon at Vernita Bar, the last free flowing
stretch of the Columbia. 9" By August 1985, there was still no
agreement among BPA, the Bureau of Reclamation, and the
Grant County Public Utility District on their respective responsibilities for providing spawning, incubation, and emergence flows
for fall chinook. 9 5

supra note 15, at 6; see generally 1985 WATER BUDGET CENTER REPORT, supra
note 114, at 2-3; see also 1984 WATER BUDGET CENTER REPORT, supra note 167, at
16-19 (summarizing 1984 problems).
191. 1985 WATER BUDGET CENTER REPORT, supra note 114, at 3. BPA claimed
its Water Budget obligations were already satisfied. Id. See also Water Budget
Center, WEEKLY REP., June 1-7, 1985; Id., WEEKLY REP., June 15-21, 1985.
192. 1985 WATER BUDGET CENTER REPORT, supra note 114, at 3.
193. Id. at 81 ("The water budget was intended to meet fisheries needs in
below normal years. However, system flexibility is [now] utilized for secondary
[power] production, limiting the provision of fishery needs").
194. See generally Bodi, FERC's Mid-Columbia Proceeding: Ten Years and
Still Counting, 16 ENVTL. L. 555 (1986).
195. See 1985 WATER BUDGET CENTER REPORT, supra note 114, at 3. ("BPA
initially refused to assist Grant County in meeting flow requirements. Eventually,
BPA provided some additional water, but the delay caused operating problems for
all the mid-Columbia PUD's, jeopardizing emerging fall chinook and caused water
budget flows to be held up to refill the PUD system"); see also Chrisman Memo-
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Of even greater long-term concern than flow and spill
problems is a threat to the integrity of the Water Budget Center
(recently rechristened the Fish Passage Center), an entity consisting of the Water Budget Managers and their staff. Because the
Center denied Chelan County PUD's attempt to gain access to an
uncompleted report on steelhead survival in the mid-Columbia
(on the grounds that, at the time, it constituted only raw,
unanalyzed data, and the Center's funding contract with BPA
contained no provisions for third party access to such data), BPA
alleged that the Center was an "advocacy" group which should no
longer be financed with ratepayer money.19 Instead of having the
Water Budget Managers control the staffing, research, and smolt
monitoring activities of the Center, BPA considers the Center to
be its contractor and subject to its control.'9 7 The power agency
apparently wanted the Center's functions to be under the control
of a multi-group advisory body, which would include BPA and
utility representatives.'"8 It is not yet clear how the Northwest
Power Planning Council will react to this attempt to control the
work product of the key information source on Water Budget implementation and fish passage efficiency.
All of these difficulties suggest that Water Budget implementation is anything but an unqualified success. Predictably, most of
the difficulties concern the Snake fish runs which are in the worst
shape, and which prompted fishery advocates to seek Endangered
Species Act protection in the late 1970's, 99 and to lobby for the
Northwest Power Act in 1980.200 Particularly discouraging is the
randum, supra note 84, at 2. For a detailed overview of the struggle to obtain fish
flows on the mid-Columbia, see Bodi, supra note 194.
196. See Workshop on the Late Great Columbia River Fishery (Part 1)
[1979-Present Transfer Binder], 32 ANADROMOUS FISH L. MEMO (NAT. RESOURCES
L. INST.) 5, 10 (Aug. 1985) (statements by Dale Evans of the National Marine
Fisheries Service and Tim Wapato of the Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission); cf. supra note 105 (BPA's objections to funding the goals study); see also
Parity III, supra note 6, at 291-92 n. 58.
197. See 1985 WATER BUDGET CENTER REPORT, supra note 114, at 7: "This
can be seen as an additional example of BPA using Program interpretation to
enlarge their [sic] role in fisheries management, while attempting to limit the
agencies and tribes' role in fisheries management and Program implementation."
198. Telephone conversation with Robert Lothrop, Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission (July 24, 1985).
199. See Bodi, supra note 21.
200. See The Pacific Northwest Power Bill and Anadromous Fish Protection
[1979-Present Transfer Binder], 4 ANADROMOUS FISH L. MEMO (NAT. RESOURCES L.
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fact that these difficulties occur at a time when the region is enjoying a long-term power surplus - when the power system
should have the most flexibility to accommodate its fishery "coequal partner."20 1 At a minimum, successful Water Budget implementation will require better coordination between power marketing and fish flows, agreement on fish passage plans (including
interim spills) for both the Columbia and Snake systems, and a
Council repudiation of BPA's attempt to control activities at the
Water Budget Center (now the Fish Passage Center).20
INST.) 1-5 (Oct. 1979); 1979 GAO REPORT, supra note 22; see also Northwest

Power Planning Council, Nw. ENERGY NEWS, Dec.-Jan. 1986, at 4-33.
201. See supra text accompanying note 25 and note 36. There will be considerably less flexibility in supplying Water Budget flows on the mid-Columbia if the

Bureau of Reclamation proceeds with plans to complete the second half of the
Columbia Basin Irrigation Project, which will draw water from behind the Grand
Coulee Dam, see Janeway, Of Time and the River: The Debate Over the Completion of the Columbia River Basin Irrigation Project, 1 Nw. ENVTL. J. no. 2 at 97
(1985); Whittlesey, Irrigation Development in the Pacific Northwest: A Mixed
Blessing, 10 ENVTL. L. 315 (1980); Workshop on the Late Great Columbia River
Fishery (Part 1) [1979-Present Transfer Binder], 32 ANADROMOUS FISH L. MEMO
(NAT. RESOURCES L. INST.) 5 (Aug. 1985) (Dale Evans suggesting that an evaluation
of the effect of irrigation project on the ability to satisfy Water Budget flows is
overdue).
A possible means to facilitate, or perhaps even increase, Water Budget flows
would be to change the hydroelectric system's "critical water year" planning criterion. Critical water planning assumes worst case, drought conditions will occur
each year and, consequently, induces system operators to place a heavy emphasis
on reservoir refill. See Risk Management Lessons, supra note 159, at 751-52. A
recent Council issue paper examined the effect of altering critical water planning
on power generation and concluded "[tihere do appear to be substantial dollar
benefits from some relaxation of the critical water standard, which flow primarily
from the reduction in capital costs by not building coal plants". NORTHWEST
POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, ISSUE PAPER ON CRITICAL WATER PLANNING 11 (Mar. 6,
1985). The analysis found that changed operating assumptions would "apparently
not seriously affect" the system's ability to meet fish flows. Id. at 10. Unfortunately, however, the issue paper completely failed to examine whether such operational changes might make it easier (or cheaper) to meet Water Budget flows, or
could enable the Council to increase the amount of water in the Water Budget to
the levels originally requested by the fishery agencies and tribes, see supra text
accompanying note 176.
202. Water Budget implementation is also likely to suffer from a lack of research and monitoring due to a dearth of test fish. The result may be insufficient
statistical evidence to justify continuation of Water Budget flows in the face of
regional pressure to market increasing amounts of power to California. See supra
section VI.B.
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The Yakima Basin Emergency Legislation: An
Unfortunate Precedent?

Although the program singled out the Yakima Basin for priority attention because of its offsite enhancement potential and
its water supply problems, 0 3 the Yakima Basin measures quickly
ran into considerable difficulty over their funding. In brief, a
Corps of Engineers legal opinion concluded that the Corps could
not accept BPA ratepayer money for capital construction at its
projects unless it was specifically authorized to do so by Congress.2"' This opinion was immediately embraced by the Bureau
of Reclamation, which operates many projects slated for capital
construction as offsite enhancement measures in the Yakima Basin. While it may seem implausible for one federal agency to balk
at accepting funds from another agency, this position nevertheless
succeeded in temporarily stalling implementation of a number of
Yakima Basin measures.
Fortunately, this log jam was broken by Congress, which
passed legislation enabling the Bureau to accept BPA funding for
Yakima Basin improvements.2 5 Congress also approved use of
the BPA fund for a number of Yakima improvements," 6 appropriated funds for certain projects,20 7 and passed cost-sharing legislation to facilitate cooperation between federal and non-federal
entities. 208 While the speed with which Congress took action to
support the program reflects its widespread political support, the
legislation pertains only to the Bureau's Yakima projects. Thus, it
203. COLUMBIA BASIN PROGRAM, supra note 4, §§ 900-04; see Collette, Fish
and Fields: The Yakima Dilemma, Nw. ENERGY NEWS, Sept.-Oct. 1984, at 10-13.
204. See Parity III, supra note 6, at 326-27 n.206.
205. The Hoover Power Plant Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-381 § 109, 98 Stat.
1333, 1340, authorized the Secretary of the Interior to "design, construct, operate,
and maintain fish passage facilities within the Yakima River Basin, and to accept
funds from any entity, public or private, to design, operate, and maintain such
facilities."
206. Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act of 1985, Pub. L. No.
98-360, 98 Stat. 403, 415 (authorizing improvements at Three Mile, Sunnyside,
Wapato, Toppenish Creek, Prosser, and Roza Dams). Section 4(h)(10)(B) of the
Northwest Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(10)(B), requires congressional approval
of capital facilities costing over $1 million.
207. Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act of 1985, Pub. L. No.
98-360, 98 Stat. 403, 407 (appropriating $4.8 million for Prosser and Roza Dam
improvements and $675,000 for Bureau of Reclamation fish studies).
208. Act of August 21, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-396, 98 Stat. 1369, 1379.
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may unintentionally serve as an unfortunate precedent. For if it
becomes necessary to enact legislation every time a federal operating agency concocts a theory why it cannot implement a program measure, expeditious program implementation will surely be
impossible.
E. National Wildlife Federation v. FERC: An Obligation to
Consider Cumulative Impacts?
Idaho's Salmon Basin contains some of the best anadromous
fish spawning habitat remaining in the Columbia Basin. Unfortunately, for a variety of reasons (mostly because of federal subsidies like tax credits, accelerated depreciation allowances, and
guaranteed purchase provisions 0 9 ), the Salmon is of considerable
interest to hydroelectric developers. There are currently around
fifty proposed Salmon Basin projects under consideration by
FERC,"10 which has jurisdiction over non-federal hydroelectric
development. 1 A number of entities, including federal and state
fish and wildlife agencies, Indian tribes, environmental organizations, and the Northwest Power Planning Council have become
concerned about the cumulative impacts resulting from this development and have urged FERC to perform an analysis of the
cumulative effects of such developments. 2 2 The Columbia Basin
Program expressly directs FERC to consolidate its consideration
of multiple proposed projects in a single river drainage and to assess the cumulative environmental effects of all existing and proposed projects.23 Although FERC recently established a process
to evaluate cumulative effects of "geographically clustered"
projects, it limited this initiative to license applications, specifically excluding the issuance of preliminary permits (which grant
an applicant priority over other applicants, but do not ensure is1
suance of a license).2
209. See generally A Trilogy of Tribes v. FERC, supra note 161.
210. See National Marine Fisheries Service, Application for Rehearing in the
Salmon River Basin Proceedings (FERC Project No. 5865), at 2 n.3 (May 4, 1984).
211. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 791-825 (1982).
212. See generally Eckberg, Cumulative Impacts of Hydropower Development Under NEPA, 16 ENvTL L. 673 (1986).
213. COLUMBIA BASIN PROGRAM, supra note 4, § 1204(b)(1).
214. See FERC's proposed "Cluster Impact Assessment Procedure (CIAP),"
50 Fed. Reg. 3385 (1985). For a detailed criticism of FERC's CIAP, see National
Marine FisheriesService Questions the Utility of FERC's Cluster Impact Assess-
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The National Wildlife Federation challenged FERC's issuance of a number of Salmon Basin preliminary permits for failing
to consider their potential cumulative effects.2" 5 The Wildlife
Federation alleged that this failure violated the National Environmental Policy Act, the Federal Power Act, and, most impor21 6
tantly for purposes of this article, the Northwest Power Act.
The Northwest Power Planning Council filed an amicus brief in
support of the Wildlife Federation's interpretation of the Northment Procedure [1979-Present Transfer Binder], 34 ANADROMOUS

FISH L. MEMO
(NAT. RESOURCES L. INST.) 8-10 (Nov. 1985) (letter of Dale Evans, Division Chief
of the National Marine Fisheries Service). Initially, the CIAP applies only to three

river basins: the Salmon in Idaho, the Snohomish in Washington, and the Owens
in California. Moreover, not only does the CIAP not apply to preliminary permits,
it allows projects within the river basins to be excluded from study if they are
"isolated" from the identified cluster. It also emphasizes the geographic proximity
of projects rather than the cumulative effects on affected resources, and fails to
explain the relationship between CIAP studies and project decisionmaking. The
National Marine Fisheries Service found the scope of the FERC proposal too limiting, suggesting that other basins be subject to the CLAP, including the Snohomish, Skagit, Nooksack, Hamma Hamma, Dungeness, Stillaquamish, Yakima, and
Wenatchee Basins in Washington; the Willamette and Rogue Basins in Oregon;
and the Merrimack, Penobscot, Connecticut, and Susquehanna Basins in the
Northeast. See Comments of William G. Gordon, Department of Commerce, Assistant Administrator for Fisheries (Feb. 28, 1985) (also criticizing the CIAP proposal for failing to specify a trigger mechanism indicating when the CIAP would
be initiated; failing to discuss how data would be obtained; failing to include provisions for "worst case" and "probable case" analyses; assuming that the status
quo for fishery resources represents an acceptable baseline; and arguing that, in
light of the massive anadromous fish enhancement and restoration efforts ongoing
in the Northwest, the "present acceptable level of impact to anadromous fish is no
impact"). On December 19, 1985, the California Department of Fish and Game
charged that FERC's "scoping document," outlining the issues to be addressed in
an EIS on the Owens Basin CIAP, was incomplete because it was restricted to just
seven of 66 applications. The state agency further alleged that, unless it were expanded, the EIS would fail to satisfy both the National Environmental Policy Act
and the California Environmental Quality Act. See Letter of Jack C. Darnell, California Dep't of Fish and Game Director, to Kenneth Plumb, FERC Secretary
(Dec. 19, 1985).
215. National Wildlife Federation v. FERC, No. 84-7325 (9th Cir. argued July
11, 1985). See Hy-Tech Co., 25 F.E.R.C. 61,410 (1983). See also Eckberg, supra
note 212; FERC Refuses Salmon River Cumulative Impacts Assessment [1979Present Transfer Binder], 24 ANADROMOuS FISH L. MEMO (NAT. RESOURCES L.
INST.) 11 (Mar. 1984); FERC Continues to Resist Cumulative Impact Assessments
but Defers to Fish and Wildlife Agency Conditions Regarding Exemptions, 25

10-12 (Apr. 1984).
216. Brief of the National Wildlife Federation, NWF v. FERC, supra note

ANADROMOUS FISH L. MEMO (NAT. RESOURCES L. INST.)
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west Power Act.2 17 The Northwest Power Act issue involves the
meaning of the statute's directive that FERC take the Columbia
Basin Program "into account to the maximum extent practicable, ' 21 8 which the Council and the Wildlife Federation interpret
to mean that FERC must implement the program or demonstrate
in writing why compliance is technically impracticable or legally
barred.2 1 9 FERC, on the other hand, interprets the statutory language to indicate that the program is merely advisory; therefore,
the program provision calling for FERC to consolidate review of
all pending hydroelectric proposals (including preliminary permits) is unenforceable. 22 0 The results of the case, pending before
the Ninth Circuit, may resolve important questions regarding the
role of the Council vis-a-vis federal agencies.2 2 '
217. Brief of the Northwest Power Planning Council, NWF v. FERC, supra
note 215. The Nez Perce tribe also intervened on the side of the Wildlife
Federation.
218. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(11)(A)(ii).

219. See

COLUMBIA BASIN PROGRAM,

supra note 4, § 1304(a)(4).

220. See infra note 240 and accompanying text.
221. The court heard oral arguments on July 11, 1985. Less than one month
later, on August 7, 1985, a different panel of the Ninth Circuit issued dicta which
could prove to be an unfortunate harbinger of the National Wildlife Federation v.
FERC case. In Idaho Power Co. v. FERC, 767 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir. 1985), upholding
FERC's denial of a license to Idaho Power's proposed Wiley Dam, the court assumed that the Council's Northwest Conservation and Electric Power Plan was
advisory in nature:
The purpose of the Plan is to guide the Administrator of the Bonneville
Power Administration . . .Although the Act calls on the Administrator to
encourage 'appropriate Federal agencies' to assist in the implementation of
the Plan . . . it does not call for such agencies to follow or consider the
Plan in acting on proposals for projects unconnected with BPA.
Id. at 1363. It is worth noting, however, that this dicta is not directed to the Columbia Basin Program, nor to directives such as § 4(h)(11)(A)(ii) of the Northwest
Power Act, supra note 218 and accompanying text.
The same Ninth Circuit panel in another case, Idaho Power Co. v. FERC, 766
F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1985), affirmed FERC's position that it may issue an exemption for a project without determining whether there is a need for the power the
project will generate. By leaving "need for power" determinations to the discretion
of FERC, id. at 1350-51, this decision makes more likely conflicts with protective
provisions of the Columbia Basin Program (supra notes 51-53, 72 and accompanying text), provisions FERC does not consider to be binding (see infra note 240).
However, the reasoning of this decision is suspect, since exemptions are clearly
subject to NEPA requirements (see 16 U.S.C. § 2705(b) (1982)), and NEPA requires agencies to specify the "purpose and need" for proposed actions. 40 C.F.R.
§ 1502.13 (1985) (CEQ regulations).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2972390

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

[Vol. 16:461

F. The Rock Island Dam Proceeding: Will FERC Enforce the
Program's Remedial Measures?
In 1984, the Ninth Circuit gave fishery interests a thoroughgoing victory when it ruled that FERC violated both the Federal
Power Act and the National Environmental Policy Act by issuing
a new forty-year license to Chelan County Public Utility District
(PUD) without requiring completion of a fish and wildlife report
required by its regulations, or preparation of an Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS) 2"2 FERC's position that it could proceed
with licensing the project while awaiting the results of studies authorized by a 1980 settlement agreement"2 was rejected by the
court, which concluded that, until the relevant studies were completed, FERC was limited to issuing annual-licenses to the project
(as it had done in 1980 and 1981).224 Unfortunately, subsequent
events have illustrated how difficult it sometimes is to translate
legal victories into biological ones.
While the court foreclosed FERC from relicensing the project
pending preparation of an EIS, the decision encouraged both
FERC and Chelan County PUD to separate Rock Island from negotiations to extend the 1980 settlement agreement.2 2

5

Conse-

quently, when the parties reached a new stipulated agreement in
March 1985 on interim fish passage measures for 1985-87 (including interim spills, increases in hatchery production, and studies
on spill effectiveness and bypass measures) at the other four midColumbia PUD dams,22 the agreement did not include Rock Is222. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation v. FERC,
746 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied 105 S. Ct. 2358 (1985); see Supreme
Court, Ninth Circuit Decisions Curb FERC Hydroelectric Authority: Good News
for Fish and Wildlife [1979-Present Transfer Binder], 26 ANADROMOUS FISH L.
MEMO (NAT. RESOURCES L. INST.) 5-7 (July 1984); A Trilogy of Tribes v. FERC,
supra note 161, at 34-46.
223. See generally Bodi, supra note 194; for a brief overview of this agreement, as well as a 1979 agreement on supplying fall spawning flow to Vernita Bar
on the Hanford Reach of the mainstem Columbia, see Hydropower vs. Salmon,

supra note 20, at 278 n.357; see also Mid-Columbia Settlement Hits Rough Water
(1979-Present Transfer Binder], 13 ANADROMOUS FISH L. MEMO (NAT. RESOURCES
L. INST.) 7 (MAY 1981).
224. Yakima Indian Nation, 746 F.2d at 473.
225. See generally Bodi, supra note 194.
226. See Stipulation, Public Utility Dist. No. 2 of Grant County, Washington,
No. E-9569 (FERC 1986). This agreement was ratified by FERC's administrative
law judge in his January 31, 1986 opinion. See 34 F.E.R.C. 1 63,044 at 65,165

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2972390

19861

REEXAMINING THE PARITY PROMISE

land Dam. Instead, a decision on interim measures at Rock Island
was left to an adjudication before a FERC administrative law
judge.
In the adjudication, Chelan

not only'resisted the gpill provi-

sions in the 1985 stipulated agreement requiring spills up to
thirty percent of the flow, 227 the utility also attacked the Colum-

bia Basin Program's call for interim spills up to twenty percent
unless Chelan could demonstrate to the Council that a juvenile
fish survival rate of at least ninety percent could be achieved with
less spill.228 Chelan alleged that such spills were not cost effective,

contending that it should be allowed to (1) reduce interim spills
during 1986 and 1987, (2) discontinue studies on the effectiveness
of spills, the magnitude of turbine mortalities, and the feasibility
of mechanical bypass installation, and (3) stop spills entirely
when hatchery compensation exceeded the utility's estimate of
project mortalities. 229 The fishery agencies and (surprisingly) the
FERC staff argued for interim spills similar to those in the 1985
stipulated agreement, establishment of a long-term spill program,
and studies of summer spill and bypass system installation.23
The Northwest Power Planning Council argued that Chelan's at(1986).
227. See Stipulation, Public Utility Dist. No. 2 of Grant County, Washington,
No. E-9569 at 11 (FERC 1986) (Wells Dam); see also id. at 4 (spills at Priest
Rapids Dam of 1.5 million acre-feet); at 6 (spills at Wampam Dam of 2.0 million
acre-feet); and at 8 (spills and other measures at Rocky Reach Dam as necessary
to achieve a 30"( bypass efficiency).

228.

COLUMBIA BASIN PROGRAM,

supra note 4, § 404(a)(10) (calling on FERC

to require Chelan to spill "at least 20% of the average daily flow . . . for any 30
out of the 60 days" that smolts are present between April 15 and June 15, unless
Chelan "can demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Council that at least 90% survival . . .can be achieved by such reduced spills"); see also id. §§ 404(a)(2), 1504
Action Item No. 32.12 (schedule for testing, evaluation, and implementation of
bypass system).
229. Chelan proposed to spill 10% of the average daily flow through the project, plus 50'%of the flow through the project's first powerhouse during the spring
of 1986, for a total of about 15% of total project flow. The next year Chelan would
discontinue spilling at the second powerhouse if it released 200,000 hatchery steelhead and 500,000 hatchery coho salmon. In the spring of 1987, Chelan proposed to
discontinue spills entirely if its hatchery contribution reached 1.4 million fish, the
annual mortality Chelan attributes to the project. See 34 F.E.R.C.
63,044 at
65,166 (1986).
230. See id. at 65,166-67. The National Wildlife Federation and intervening
Indian tribes argued for a 30-day project shutdown during the spring migration.
34 F.E.R.C. 63,044, at 65,166 (1986).
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tempt to stop testing and evaluating bypass systems and substitute a compensation program consisting largely of hatchery supplementation conflicted with the Columbia Basin Program's
primary goal of restoring wild and natural stocks.2"'
On January 31, 1986, FERC Judge Stephen Grossman
handed down a decision that accepted Chelan's allegations concerning the project's fishery effects,2 2 and approved the utility's
proposed 1986 interim spill program as not inconsistent with the
2 33
Columbia Basin Program's ninety percent survival standard.

However, the decision refused to allow Chelan to stop testing bypass systems, ordered the utility to model summer spills, and
found its plan to substitute hatchery production for passage improvements to be at best premature.2 3' Moreover, Judge Grossman squarely rejected Chelan's attempt to have its fishery obligations determined on a cost-benefit basis; 23 1 such a litmus, he
231. Northwest Power Planning Council, Post-Hearing Memorandum (Project No. 943-002, Phase III) at 18 (n.d.) (citing § 701 of the Columbia Basin Program). The Council also noted that "hatchery-based propagation measures must
be approached with caution because of problems with disease, stock selection, genetics, and other questions." Id. at 18-19 (also citing § 701 of the program).
The Council also pointed out that, during the development of the Columbia
Basin Program, Chelan endorsed the program of interim spills and bypass development and failed to seek an amendment to that program once it was adopted.
Therefore, the Council argued that "Chelan should not be permitted to complain
of measures it encouraged the Council to adopt." Id. at 16-17, 24.
232. Public Utility Dist. No. 1 of Chelan County, Wash., 34 F.E.R.C. 63,044
at 65,167 (1986) (accepting Chelan's estimates of turbine mortalities at Rock Island's second powerhouse of 5.7% for coho and 3.9% for steelhead, 11% at the
first powerhouse, and reservoir mortalities of 2%).
233. Id. at 65,169. ("Further, the resulting survival levels exceed 90 percent
and therefore satisfy the Council's criterion for reducing spill to below 20 percent
of the daily flow ... Thus for interim purposes, Chelan's proposed spill for 1986
is adequate; during peak spring migration, Chelan shall spill 10 percent of the flow
passage through the project and 50 percent of the flow passing the first powerhouse.") It should be noted, however, that § 404(a)(10) of the COLUMBIA BASIN
PROGRAM, supra note 228, allows for reductions below 20% spill only if the Council (not a FERC administrative law judge) is satisfied that lower spills will ensure
at least a 90% survival rate.
234. 34 F.E.R.C. 63,044 at 65,170-73. While noting hatchery compensation
will continue to be necessary because of reservoir mortalities and other losses that
cannot be prevented, Judge Grossman ordered Chelan to protect wild stocks "to
the maximum extent possible" in developing its compensation program. Id. at
65,172-73.
235. Cf. Lothrop, The Misplaced Role of Cost-Benefit Analysis in Columbia
Basin Fishery Mitigation, 16 ENVTL. L. 517 (1986); Parity H, supra note 26, at
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concluded, would be inconsistent with the Federal Power Act, the
Northwest Power Act, and Indian treaty fishing rights.2 36 According to the FERC judge, "[elven if economic efficiency were the
determinative criterion for adequate protection, the costs of mitigation would be small compared to the total benefits enjoyed by
Rock Island's licensees and ratepayers" and, under section 10(a)
of the Federal Power Act, fish passage measures must be considered "a cost of doing business on a river containing anadromous
fish populations.

23 7
1

Further, he ruled that, while economic costs

must be considered before a decision to install mechanical bypass,
during the interim period (before the prescription of permanent
remedies) FERC "has a countervailing responsibility to ensure a
search for the 'best available' collection and bypass systems."23
The source of this responsibility, according to Judge Grossman, is
the Columbia Basin Program.2 3 9
Thus, while the Grossman decision sanctions Chelan County
PUD's attempt to spill less water at Rock Island Dam during
146-52.
236. The judge ruled that "[tihis mid-Columbia proceeding has a 'comprehensive' scope under Section 10(a) [of the Federal Power Act], which is inconsistent with the cost-benefit analysis urged by Chelan." 34 F.E.R.C. $ 63,044 at
65,168. He also determined that:
under Section 10(a) and other relevant legal authority, [Chelan] must do
more than 'compensate' for Rock Island's damage to the current run; it
must also make efforts to enhance future runs. Mitigation, to the extent it
is feasible, must be considered the preferred solution. Mitigation entails efforts to preserve, rather than replace, the existing resource. Whether this
mitigation is practicable is a matter to be addressed in determining 'equitable treatment.' Compensation will be required to the extent mitigative efforts are not successful. Chelan's overriding reliance upon a cost-benefit
analysis cannot be accepted.
Id. In addition, Judge Grossman stated that the "equitable treatment" standard
that § 4(h)(11)(A)(i) of the Northwest Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(11)(A)(i),
imposes on FERC "suggests that fisheries and power production on the Columbia
River should not be balanced solely on a cost-benefit analysis." Id. at 65,168. He
also thought that Chelan's attempt to cease interim spills and bypass development
"may be inconsistent with Indian Tribal rights under treaties and other federal
fiduciary responsibilities" because the present fish runs may not satisfy the treaty
right to take fish. Id. at 65,169.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 65,171.
239. Id. (citing § 404(a)(2) of the program and ordering Chelan to proceed
with mechanical bypass studies at both the first and second powerhouses at Rock
Island Dam).
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1986 and 1987, its reasoning may lead to more protective longterm measures for Rock Island Dam and the other FERC-licensed

projects on the mid-Columbia. Probably the most disturbing agpect of the decision is that in this, the first substantial indication
that FERC may voluntarily comply with the Northwest Power
Act's directive of taking the Columbia Basin Program into account "to the full~st extent practicable, ' 24 0 the program provision
at issue - the ninety percent survival standard - represents one
of the weakest links of the program.2 1 The near-term result of
reduced spills at Rock Island Dam, a result the Council opposed,
calls into question the sufficiency of the Columbia Basin Program's spill provisions, as well as the Council's decision in the
242
1986 amendments not to increase spill protection.
G.

The Steamboaters v. FERC and the Power to Condition
FERC Exemptions

For the past several years, Oregon's North Umpqua River has
been the subject of a protracted legal dispute.24 s In 1983 FERC
authorized installation of hydroelectric generators at Winchester
Dam over the protests of local fishermen who claimed that the
generators would increase anadromous fish mortalities at the
dam.2 " Subsequent events proved that these fears were well
240. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(11)(A)(ii). It remains to be seen whether the FERC
Commissioners will accept the reasoning of their administrative law judge, however, since FERC apparently considers the program to be merely advisory. See
Letter of Raymond O'Connor, Chairman of the Federal Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, to Congressman Richard Ottinger, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Energy Conservation and Power (Feb. 17, 1984) ("[tihe Commission, however, is not bound to accept or adopt the Council's program, just as it has not been
required to adopt similar comprehensive plans developed on other river basins.
The Commission must maintain its role as an independent regulatory agency with
a national, not just a regional or river basin perspective.") Recently, FERC
amended its regulations to require applicants to explain how and why their
projects would comply with relevant state and regional comprehensive plans such
as the Columbia Basin Program and, if they do not comply, why they nevertheless
should be authorized. 18 C.F.R. § 4.38(0 (1985).
241. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. (90% survival standard supplies no protection above pre-Northwest Power Act operations).
242. See supra notes 120-32 and accompanying text.
243. See generally Blumm & Kloos, Small Scale Hydropower and Anadromous Fish: Lessons and Questions From the Winchester Dam Controversy, 16
ENVTL. L. 583 (1986).
244. See NMFS and The Steamboaters Challenge FERC on Winchester Pro-
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founded; in fact, the project had to be shut down pending installation of more efficient protective measures. Numerous questions
remain concerning the project's compliance with the conditions
specified by the Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife and
United States Fish and Wildlife Service," 5 and on May 9, 1985, a
unanimous panel of the Ninth Circuit concluded that FERC violated the National Environmental Policy Act when it granted an
exemption from licensing, authorizing construction of the project.2" 6 Unfortunately, however, the court also determined that
the fish conditions imposed by the National Marine
Fisheries Ser2 47
vice (NMFS) were merely advisory in nature.

On the EIS issue, Judge Norris ruled that FERC was unreasonable in not at least preparing an Environmental Assessment
before making a decision on the project.'" The court rejected
FERC's attempt to claim that the project's environmental effects
would be insignificant because of fishery conditions specified by
the United States Fish and Wildlife Service and the Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife, noting that FERC ignored "serious questions" raised about the environmental consequences of
the project and about its compliance with the conditions.249 Quite
significantly, the Ninth Circuit refused to allow FERC to rely exclusively on the fishery agencies' examination of the project, holding that under NEPA FERC "must independently assess the consequences of a project. 21 50 This ruling calls into question a

number of recent FERC exemption decisions that attempt to saddle the United States Fish and Wildlife Service and state fish and
ject [1979-Present Transfer Binder), 23 ANADROMOUS FISH L. MEMO (NAT. RESOURCES L. INST.) 13-14 (Aug. 1985).
245. See Senator Hatfield Queries FERC on Winchester Dam Enforcement,
29 ANADROMOUS FISH L. MEMO (NAT. RESOURCES L. INST.) 11-12 (May 1985) (letter
from Senator Mark Hatfield).
246. The Steamboaters v. FERC,759 F.2d 1382 (9th Cir. 1985).
247. Id. at 1388-89.
248. Id. at 1392-94. An Environmental Assessment (EA) is generally required
to support an agency's claim that a project will not have significant environmental
effects, and thus not require preparation of an EIS. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(a)( 2 ) (1985)
(NEPA regulations). An EA must "supply a convincing statement of reasons why
potential effects are insignificant," and show that that agency "took a 'hard look'
at the evidence." 759 F.2d at 1393.
249. Id. at 1393. At a minimum, according to the court, FERC must "explain
specifically how the conditions would mitigate the impact of the project." Id. at
1394.
250. Id. at 1394.
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wildlife agencies with FERC's NEPA responsibilities, including
responsibility for assessing cumulative impacts. 51
While the court's NEPA holding is good news, its conclusion
that NMFS is not among those agencies which may prescribe
mandatory fish and wildlife conditions" 2 poses a new challenge
because it leaves control over fishery protection measures at exemptions to the United States Fish and Wildlife Service and state
fish and wildlife agencies. NMFS' role is, according to the court,
only an advisory one. 53 The result involves quite a lot more than
a loss of agency turf. In the effort to preserve and restore the
Northwest's salmon and steelhead runs, NMFS has proved itself
251. In Olympus Energy Corp., 26 F.E.R.C. 61,407 (1984), FERC determined that in the case of exemptions (not licenses) fishery agency conditions were
mandatory; that FERC had no role in establishing such conditions; and that, as a
result, any cumulative impact analyses would have to be performed by fishery
agencies, not FERC. See FERC Continues to Resist Cumulative Impact Assessments But Defers to Fish and Wildlife Agency ConditionsRegarding Exemptions
[1979-Present Transfer Binder], 25 ANADROMOUS FISH L. MEMO (NAT. RESOURCES
L. INST.) 10-11 (May 1984). FERC reached this conclusion despite the fact that the
pertinent statutory provision, § 30(c) of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §
823a(c) (1982), quite clearly provides for fishery agency condition under subparagraph (1) and FERC conditions in subparagraph (2). However, FERC subsequently denied any fish and wildlife responsibilities under subparagraph (2): "the
argument that the Commission has the authority and responsibility to attach additional fish and wildlife condition ignores the mutual exclusivity of these sections." Middle Fork Irrigation Dist., 30 F.E.R.C. $ 61,258 at 61,537 (1985) (relying
on Olympus to refuse a condition offered by the Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish
Commission concerning a Hood River Basin project). In Middle Fork, FERC also
concluded that its comprehensive planning mandate under § 10(a) of the Federal
Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 803(a), does not apply to exemptions, id. at 61,538; determined that its (now vulnerable in light of the Winchester case) Olympus decision
required the deletion of a standard exemption article requiring review of projects
in the Columbia Basin by the Northwest Power Planning Council, id. at 61,540
n.22; and denied it had any trust responsibility toward Indian tribes; id. at 61,53839.
252. 759 F.2d at 1388-89. The court concluded that since § 30(c) of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 823a(c), failed to expressly mention NMFS, Congress
did not mean to include the agency, despite the fact that the provision contemplates that fishery conditions will be specified through Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act procedures, and NMFS is clearly a consulting agency under the Coordination Act.
253. 759 F.2d at 1388-89. However, the court did note that FERC is not "entitled to wholly ignore NMFS contentions regarding the environmental effects of
the project" and indicated that FERC must take a "hard look" at NMFS conditions and whether they are necessary to prevent adverse impacts. Id. at 1394 n.5.
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to be more vigilant and skilled than either the Fish and Wildlife
Service or state agencies. This is evident in the Winchester case,
where the NMFS conditions were the most stringent and detailed
and, as subsequent events verified, the most necessary. 254 Congress ought to amend the statute so that the agency most experienced in salmon and steelhead protection has the legal authority
to protect habitat from small-scale hydroelectric projects. It
makes no sense to commit millions of ratepayer and taxpayer dollars to restoration efforts
while disabling the most capable habitat
255
protection agency.
H. Sierra Club v. FERC: Are New Dams Really Eligible for
Federal Subsidies?
In a 1984 suit filed in the Ninth Circuit, a number of environmental organizations charged that FERC improperly extended
federal subsidies (like tax breaks and guaranteed purchase provisions) to hydroelectric projects at new dams.2 " According to the
plaintiffs, Congress intended to restrict these benefits to projects
at existing dams. Earlier, the Ninth Circuit ruled, in Tulalip
Tribes v.FERC,5 7 that FERC improperly extended its expedited
254. See Blumm & Kloos, supra note 243.
255. Congressman John Dingell, author of most of the fish and wildlife provisions of the Northwest Power Act, see Parity I, supra note 24, at 518-20, apparently agrees. On May 23, 1985, he introduced H.R. 2605 which would include
NMFS among the agencies listed in § 30(c) of the Federal Power Act. Given
FERC's recent deletion of Northwest Power Planning Council review in the Middle Fork Irrigation District case, supra note 251, Congressman Dingell (and perhaps former Council Chairman, now Senator, Dan Evans) may wish to introduce
legislation ensuring that the Council has similar conditioning authority. A draft
bill authored by Congressman Al Swift would authorize FERC to approve state
and regional plans, like the Council's Columbia Basin Program, as the "comprehensive plan" to which FERC actions must be conformed under § 10(a) of the
Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 803(a). See Congressman Swift Drafts Bill to Alter FERC Hydroelectric Decision Making [1979-Present Transfer Binder], 33
ANADROMOUS FiSH L. MEMO (NAT. RESOURCES L. INST.) 9-10 (Sept. 1985). On comprehensive planning under the Federal Power Act, see Cole, Reviving the Federal
Power Act's Comprehensive Plan Requirement: A History of Neglect and Prospects for the Future, 16 ENVTL. L. 639 (1986); see also Krause, Comprehensive
Planning of Small Hydropower, 2 Nw. ENVTL. J. no. 1 at 17 (1986) (advocating
comprehensive planning under the Northwest Power Act).
256. No. 84-7720 (filed Oct. 31, 1984); see W. NAT. RESOURCES L. DIG., Case
No. 23.3.
257. 732 F.2d 1451 (9th Cir. 1984); see Supreme Court, Ninth Circuit Deci-
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authorization process (exemption process) to new dams. This case
may not come down the same way since the plaintiffs may have
waited too long to challenge FERC. However, a ruling that restricted federal subsidies to projects at existing dams would stop
the blizzard of hydroelectric applications that now overtax fish
and wildlife agency resources and threaten valuable anadromous
fish habitat. 6 8 Such a ruling would also give the Northwest Power
Planning Council time to complete extremely important Columbia Basin Program measures, such as setting anadromous fish
goals, ranking hydroelectric sites, establishing a methodology to
assess cumulative impacts of hydroelectric development, and
designating areas to be protected from further development? 9
VII.

CONCLUSION: THE CHALLENGES AHEAD

The Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program is an ambitious, innovative, unprecedented restoration program. It was authorized by a statute in the vanguard of federal wildlife law; it
benefited from an extremely successful and widespread public
participation effort; and it was promulgated by an entity that
may represent a new institutional model in federal-state relations.
Well conceived provisions, accessible decision makers, and good
intentions, however, cannot be the litmus test of the program's
success - they are not substitutes for on-the-ground program implementation and, ultimately, restored fish runs. This article
reveals that, as of early 1986, the Columbia Basin Program has
more implementation challenges than implementation successes.
Many of these challenges must be resolved in the courts or in
Congress, but a few - like Water Budget implementation, fish
passage protection through spills and bypass systems, and fishery
conditions for Intertie access - are at least initially matters for
the Northwest Power Planning Council. Even those issues which
sions Curb FERC Hydroelectric Authority: Good News for Fish and Wildlife
[1979-Present Transfer Binder], 26 ANADROMOUS FISH L. MEMO (NAT. RESOURCES
L. INST.) 3-5 (July 1984); A Trilogy of Tribes v. FERC, supra note 161, at 6-20.
258. Note, however, that tax credits for hydroelectric projects under § 221(a)
of the Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act, 26 U.S.C. § 46 (Supp. III 1985), expired on December 31, 1985.
259. See COLUMBIA BASIN PROGRAM, supra note 4, § 201 (goals); NORTHWEST
POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, NORTHWEST CONSERVATION AND ELECTRIC POWER PLAN

10-11 to 10-20 (1983) (site ranking); COLUMBIA BASIN PROGRAM, supra note 4, at §§
1204(b) (cumulative impacts) and (c) (protected areas).
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are outside its jurisdiction can be influenced by an aggressive
Council, a Council as concerned about program implementation
as it was about program development.2 0 Unfortunately, the 1986
Amendments reveal a Council willing to defer implementation of
protective measures pending studies aimed at reducing uncertainties about the benefits produced by those measures.2 1 Deferring
effective remedial action pending studies characterized the preNorthwest Power Act era. 22 However, the 1980 statute was
designed to overcome this method of decision making, which produced too little action, too late.26 Because the Council seems to
have forgotten these lessons of the past, and because of the numerous challenges confronting it, the jury is still out on the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program.

260. To encourage the Council to play a more active role in implementing its
program, Ed Chaney suggests a program amendment that would enable a sponsor
of a program measure to trigger a "show cause" process if BPA failed to fund the
measure in a timely manner. This process would be conducted by an ombudsman
appointed by the Council. The ombudsman would engage in a formal fact-finding
on the basis of written statements of the sponsor and BPA and consultation with
the parties. The ombudsman's report, along with comments on the report by the
parties, would then be forwarded to the Council for action. See Chaney, Implementing the Columbia River Basin Fish and Wildlife Program: A Case History,
22 IDAHo L. REv. no. 3 (forthcoming, 1986) (case history of the difficulties of im-

plementing program measures in the Umatilla Subbasin).
261. See supra text accompanying notes 122-32.
262. See Hydropower vs. Salmon, supra note 20, at 256-57, 298.
263. See Parity II, supra note 26, at 110-12, 124-39, 143-46; Parity III, supra
note 6, at 281-85.
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